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PATIENTS WITH ALZHEIMER’S OR OTHER 
DEMENTIAS
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Patients with dementia present difficult issues for health-care 
decisionmaking. This article addresses the moral and legal issues 
posed by end of life decisionmaking for such patients. In general, 
the ethical goals of care are to assure that patients’ choices are 
respected and that patients’ best interests are protected. These 
goals may not always recommend the same decisions about care, 
however, and there is controversy about how they should be 
balanced when they conflict. In addition, the law may not always 
further these goals, nor be as helpful as it could be in resolving 
conflicts between them.
In the bioethics literature, respect for patients’ autonomy is 
generally taken to be the more weighty value. In the literature 
about dementia, however, this priority has been questioned. Some 
commentators have argued that, given the immense personal 
changes involved in  the development of dementia, the best interests 
of a now-demented patient ought to take precedence over the choices 
of the previously-competent person. This article begins with issues 
raised by the value of autonomy, then turns to questions about the 
patient’s interests, and finally discusses the resolution of conflicts 
between the two. The first section considers the patient’s own 
participation in decisionmaking about care, emphasizing the 
importance of preserving present autonomy to the extent possible.1 
The second section discusses precedent autonomy and the mecha­nisms by which it may be fostered, such as living wills and special
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powers of attorney for health care.2 The third section examines 
arguments undermining the authority of precedent autonomy, 
including empirical data about the instability of preferences and the 
significance of radical alterations in personality.3 The fourth section 
takes up accounts of how to assess the best interests of patients 
with dementia, including hedonic accounts, preference accounts, and 
theories of objective interests.4 The final section defends a balance 
between precedent autonomy and best interests, arguing that as 
expressions of prior choice become clearer, they should bear the 
greater weight; correspondingly, when there are very strong interest 
based considerations that involve the patient’s present experiences, they should prevail over less clear indications of prior choice.6
Because patients with dementia experience a more-or-less drawn- 
out downhill course, they present a variety of problems in end-of-life 
care. One problem is that it is not even clear what counts as “end- 
of-life care” for such patients. Although one study indicates a 53% 
mortality within six months for patients with dementia and 
pneumonia, and a 55% mortality within six months for patients with 
dementia and hip fracture, such patients with dementia may not 
meet the criteria for invocation of state advance directive statutes 
which require that a patient either be terminally ill in a narrow 
sense or permanently comatose.6 The scope of this article therefore 
includes decisions along what may be an extended course of care, 
rather than merely decisions at an apparent end point, such as 
DNAR (“do not attempt resuscitation”) orders. Some of these 
decisions involve illnesses not associated directly with the dementia: 
cancer, diabetes, hypertension. Others involve conditions that are 
more direct manifestations of the dementia, such as malnutrition 
and the inability to take food orally, or pneumonia.
2 See infra notes 47-128 and accompanying text.3 See infra notes 129-70 and accompanying text.4 See infra notes 171-219 and accompanying text.5 See infra notes 220 and accompanying text.
6 R. Sean Morrison & Albert L. Siu, Survival in End-Stage Dementia Following Acute 
Illness, 284 JAMA 47, 50-51 (2000).
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I. D ecisionm ak ing  Ab o u t  Care: Th e  Patient’s  Ow n  Role
Patients have the moral and legal right to make their own 
health-care decisions, to the extent that they are able to do so. This 
right applies to all patients, whether or not they have been diag­
nosed with dementia. The Ethics and Humanities Subcommittee o£ 
the American Academy of Neurology reminds physicians of the 
importance of trying to maintain the patient’s ability to participate 
in decisions about care: “Neurologists may unintentionally deper­
sonalize demented patients because subconsciously they may equate 
the loss of intellect with the loss of personhood. . . .  Neurologists 
should optimize the therapeutic benefit of the patient-phyaician 
relationship by striving to maintain respect for the patient and 
r e c o g n iz in g  and avoiding depersonalization behavior.”7 This section 
takes up two forms of patient participation: making their ov/n 
decisions directly, and creating advance directives to be used when 
they are no longer able to participate themselves.
A. DIRECT PARTICIPATION BY THE PATIENT IN DECISIONS ABOUT CARE
A diagnosis of dementia does not preclude a patient’s ability to 
participate directly in decisions about her care. There are, however, 
characteristic issues that are likely to arise with respect to the 
decisionmaking capacities of patients with dementia, such as loss of 
cognitive faculties, memory failures, communication difficulties, 
frailty, and dependency. This section first sets out the appropriate 
framework to be usedin deciding whether a patient has the capacity 
to participate in decisions, and then takes up the significance of 
these special problems.
First, a brief note about the medical issues involved in managing patients with dementia for maximum participation in health-care 
decisionmaking. Patients near the end of a downhill course of 
dementia alniost certainly cannot participate in health-care 
decisionmaking and cannot be enabled to do so through medical
7 Am. Acad, of Neurology, Ethics and Humanities Subcomm., Ethical Issues in the Management of the Demented Patient, 46 NEUROLOGY 1180,1180-83 (1996) [hereinafter Am. 
Acad, of Neurology].
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management. Nonetheless, the reminder is in order that medical 
management itself may affect the cognitive and communicative 
abilities of patients.8 This reminder is perhaps especially in order 
in light of data that significant percentages of physicians may 
equate a diagnosis of dementia with incompetence.9 Medical choices 
can be arranged so as to help patients meet the standards set out 
below. Examples include treating depression, treating co-morbidi­
ties that affect cognition such as hypertension or diabetes, correct­
ing deficits in sight or hearing, and ensuring proper nutrition.10 In 
some cases, difficult moral choices may be faced when there are 
conflicts between apparently optimal therapeutic management and 
efforts to enable the patient to participate in decisions; adjustment 
of medication to control agitation or pain is an example. Nonethe­
less, at a minimum autonomy requires acknowledging such conflicts 
and attempting to minimize them.
1. Capacities and Legal Competence. The terminology of 
“capacity/incapacity” and “competence/incompetence” is an initial 
source of confusion in discussions of the patient’s participation in 
health-care decisionmaking. Strictly speaking, “competence/ 
incompetence” are legal standards; “capacity/incapacity” refer to 
facts about the patient’s abilities. “Incompetence” is a legal status: 
incompetent persons lack the legal power to make the range of 
decisions for which they have been declared incompetent. In its 
formal sense, a finding of incompetence requires a judicial determi­
nation. Without such a determination, patients are presumed 
competent; that is, are presumed to have the legal power to make 
their own decisions with respect to health care or any other matters. 
The terms “capacity” and “incapacity” refer to the patient’s actual 
abilities. Incapacity indicates a medical or psychological judgment 
about what a person can or cannot do. Determinations of legal 
competence rest on such factual judgments about capacities. 
Capacities can fluctuate from moment to moment; competence is an 
ongoing status, subject of course to judicial revision. Terminology in
8 Id.9 Seena Fazel et al., Dementia, Intelligence, and the Competence to Complete Advance 
Directives, 354 LANCET 48 (1999).10 Am. Acad, of Neurology, supra note 7, at 1180-83.
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this area is not always clear, however, and “competence/incompe­
tence” and “capacity/incapacity” may be used interchangeably. Moreover, patients are frequently regarded as incompetent without 
a formal judicial determination, when their loss of capacities is 
undisputed; and courts encourage such informal judgments.11 At times, this terminological confusion can be problematic, as when 
legal structures are set up with the goal of avoiding the need for a 
judicial determination of incompetence when a patient lacks 
decisionmaking capacity, but the terminology used in the structures 
is “competence/incompetence.”12
Standards about the capacities which are relevant to a patient’s 
making his or her own health-care decisions are linked to the moral value of protecting autonomy. Autonomy, as generally understood, 
means patients’ ability to choose for themselves in accord with their 
own values.13 If patients are unable to make reasoned choices, or to 
communicate the choices they have made, they can no longer 
manifest autonomy directly and autonomy can no longer be 
protected for them by honoring their present choices. Accordingly, 
patients should have at least the following capacities in order to 
participate in their health-care decisions: a basic understanding of 
their condition, the choice(s) they face, and the alternatives 
available to them and their likely outcomes; the ability to articulate 
their values to a rudimentary extent; and the ability to link chosen 
alternatives to their values in a reasoned way. When patients lack these capacities and are likely to continue to do so for an extended 
period, a legal determination of incompetence may be needed and 
appropriate.
In addition to respect for autonomy, the patient’s best interest is 
also a value in decisionmaking about care. In recognition of this 
value, some commentators suggest setting the standard for legal 
competence with both autonomy and the patient’s best interests in
11 Wendland v. Wendland, 93 Cal. Rptr. 2d 550 (CaL Ct App. 2000), reuiew granted and 
opinion superseded by, In re Conservatorship of Wendland, 2 P.3d 1065 (CaL 2000); In re 
Conservatorship of Drabick, 245 CaL Rptr. 840,844 (Cal. Ct App. 1988).
12 ALAN D. LlEBERSON, ADVANCE MEDICAL DIRECTIVES (1992 & Supp. 2000); ALAN 
Meisel , Th e  R ight to  D ie  (2d ed. 1995 & Supp. 2000).13 But see Agnieszka Jaworska, Respecting the Margins of Agency: Alzheimer's Patients 
and the Capacity to Value, 28 PHIL. & PUB. Aff. 105 (1999) (defining “autonomy" as “capacity 
to value”).
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mind. Buchanan & Brock14 argue that where the risks of a particu­
lar choice are high and irreversible, and where the chosen alterna­
tive appears to be clearly against the patient’s best interests, the 
standard for competence should be set high.15 On the other hand, 
where risks are low and the patients’ choices appear to be in accord 
with their interests, the bar for competence should be lowered, 
allowing more limited abilities of understanding and articulation. 
Their example of a risky choice against interests is refusal of 
surgery for a simple appendectomy when there is no apparent 
explanation for the refusal in the patient’s own values. A decision 
to withdraw or withhold treatment, when death is a risk, may meet 
these criteria, provided it is clearly against the patient’s best 
interests. But a decision to treat when the result would be signifi­
cant discomfort or morbidity and little prolongation of life, or 
prolongation of life with limited quality, also might be against the 
patient’s interests.16 Even on such a risk-related standard for 
competence, death is not the only, or always the worst, evil.
Risk-related standards for competence have been criticized 
severely. Wicclair points out that they have not been accepted 
legally.17 Perhaps this failure is judicious, in light of other difficul­
ties Wicclair identifies, that the risk-related standard is both 
asymmetrical and normative. The asymmetry is that on the risk- 
related standard, a patient might be both competent and incompe­
tent with respect to the same choice situation: competent to choose 
the course of action that is not regarded as risky, but not competent 
to choose the course of action that is. In the example of the 
appendectomy above, a patient who can meet a lower standard 
might be competent to choose the surgery, but not competent to 
refuse. Wicclair contends that this standard builds judgments about 
the content of decisions into determinations of competence and thus 
is implicitly normative.18 He voices the particular concern that it
w A lle n  e .  B u ch an a n  & D an W. B rock , d e c id in g  f o r  O th e rs : T he E th ic s  o f  
S u r ro g a te  D ecis io n m ak in g  (1989).15 James F.Drane, The Many Faces of Competency, 15 HASTINGS CENTER Rep. , Apr. 1985, at 17-21.10 Id.17 Mark Wicclair, Patient Decision-Making Capacity and Risk, 5 BIOETHICS 91 (1991).18 Id.
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may lead health-care providers to be overly willing to judge a 
patient competent who agrees with therapeutic recommendations.19 Wicclair concludes instead that when decisions are riskier, we 
should be more careful in assessing competence, but should not 
change standards for competence themselves, either at the high or at the low end.20 In a subsequent contribution to the debate, Wilks 
argues that the risk-related standard is not content based in the 
sense that it relies on the outcome of the decision, but that asymme­
tries of competence are appropriate when decisions are more 
complex.21 Brock replies that if the goal of a judgment of legal 
competence is to transfer the power to decide from the patient to a 
surrogate, it is appropriate to build both respect for autonomy and 
concern for the patient’s interests into a determination of compe­
tence.22 As a practical matter, however, risk-related standards have 
not found their way into judicial determinations of incompetence.
Adjudications of incompetence determine legal status and 
transfer decisionmaking power from the patient to a surrogate 
appointed for that purpose. For health-care decisions, such 
determinations are infrequent; resort to them is most likely when 
there is disagreement about the appropriate course of action or 
concern about its legal ramifications, as there was in early cases 
authorizing discontinuation of ventilator support or medically- provided nutrition.23 In the leading text about end of life 
decisionmaking, Meisel describes approvingly the fact that most 
difficult health-care decisions about incompetent patients are made 
without resort to the courts.24 At the same time, Meisel notes 
continuing reluctance on the part of physicians to discontinue life- 
sustaining treatment without judicial authorization. The ironic
19 Id.20 Id.
21 Ian  Wilks, The Debate Over Risk-Related Standards of Competence, 11 BIOETHICS 416 
(1997). Contra Gita S. Cale, Continuing the Debate Over Risk-Related Standards of 
Competence, 13 BIOETHICS 131 (1999).22 See generally D an W. Brock, Decisionmaking Competence and Risk, 5 BIOETHICS 105 
(1991); Dan W. Brock, Trumping Advance Directives, 21 HASTINGS CENTER REP., Sept-OcL 
1991, a t  S5-S6.
23 Meisel, supra note 12, a t  164; In re Conservatorship of Drabick, 245 CaL Rptr. 840 
(CaL Ct. App. 1988).24 MEISEL, supra note 12, a t  164.
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result may be inappropriate decisions to continue care, with as 
much or more frequency as inappropriate decisions to discontinue 
care.Because they deprive the patient of a fundamental liberty, 
adjudications of incompetence require a high burden of proof, that 
of clear and convincing evidence, and they must be narrowly tailored 
to the patient’s situation. Guardianships are thus often structured 
for limited purposes, such as health-care decisionmaking. In 
determining the need for guardianship, courts have been moving 
away from a focus on incapacities generally, to more specific 
consideration of whether patients lack the capacities outlined above 
to make reasoned decisions for their care. Meisel states forcefully the difference between assessments of these capacities and disagree­
ment with a patient’s apparent decision to refuse treatment: “It is 
essential. . .  to distinguish refusal of treatment as a triggering 
factor from refusal of treatment as evidence (or worse, the equiva­
lent) of incompetence.”26 Assessments of such a loss of capacity are 
factual judgments, relying on testimony from those who have 
assessed or worked with the patient. Law in at least one state, 
however, does not require a formal investigation for a determination 
of incompetence “if there is clear and convincing evidence from a 
physician that the person . . .  suffers from. . .  fourth stage Alzhei­
mer’s disease.”26
2. Special Problems in Applying Standards of Competence to 
Patients with Dementia. Cognitive deficits of patients with demen­
tia may affect all of the capacities involved in making reasoned decisionmaking about health care. Patients may have limited 
cognitive abilities to understand information, to formulate the 
abstractions involved in having values, and to engage in 
decisionmaking processes. These impairments are not, however, 
predictably uniform among patients. They will also vary in their 
significance for particular decisions, depending on the complexity of 
the decision at stake. Commentators, therefore, stress that 
judgments of the capacity of a patient with Alzheimer’s to partici­
pate in care decisions must be assessed on a situation-by-situation
25 Id. at 120-21.
28 Utah Code Ann. § 75-5-303(4)(a) (2000).
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basis.27 In addition to generally diminished capacity, several more 
specific problems are also likely to be encountered in patients with dementia.
Alzheimer’s patients are likely to evidence difficulties with short­
term memory. They may be unable, for example, to remember a 
recent conversation about a health-care decision. Thus a conversa­
tion about a treatment decision that occurred on one day may have 
been forgotten by the next. Such memory impairments, however, do 
not entail that a patient is incapable of making health-care deci­
sions. Fellows argues that the fact that a memory impaired patient 
forgets earlier decisions should not undermine a judgment of 
capacity, so long as there is stability in the conclusions reached.28 
On Fellows’ view, if the patient, thinking through the problem 
apparently anew, reaches the same conclusion that she did earlier, 
a judgment of capacity might be justified. The problem in such a 
case would be whether the patient is able to understand her 
condition and its significance and to formulate values; the loss of 
memory of a time-limited conversational event would not show 
conclusively the absence of such other capacities.29
Depression is another source of difficulty in assessing the 
capacities of patients with dementia. Depression is a somewhat 
common correlate of dementia, one that may be difficult to 
diagnose.80 Depression may affect cognition as well as affect. 
Depressed patients may be unable or u n w il l in g  to express values, or 
to process information in accord with their values. An important 
factor in attempting to foster the capacities of patients with 
dementia, therefore, is assessing and treating depression. The fact 
of depression, however, does not itself indicate incapacity; it is just 
one among the many factors that may affect the patients ability to 
engage in reasoned decisionmaking.
Patients with dementia, moreover, may experience difficulties in 
com m unication that do not fully reflect their underlying abilities to
27 Lesley K  Fellows, Competency and Consent in Dementia, 46 J .  AM. GERIATRICS SOC*Y 
922,923(1998).28 Id.29 See generally Jaworska, supra note 13.
30 See generally Thomas B. Mackenzie et aL, Differences Between Patient and Family 
Assessments o f Depression in Alzheimer's Disease, 146 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 1174 (1989).
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make choices and express their wishes. Linguistic disturbances 
such as the inability to remember words are a common manifesta­tion of Alzheimer’s dementia. The relatively fast-paced rhythm of 
ordinary conversation is another difficulty. Recent research 
suggests that patients with early and mid-stage Alzheimer’s 
demonstrate more understanding than is frequently believed.31 
Methods for improving communication with demented patients have 
been developed, such as slowing down the speed of conversations 
and introducing methods of conversational control.32
Frailty and resulting dependency are another set of problems 
encountered when patients have dementia. Patients who are 
physically frail may evidence fluctuating capacities to participate in 
decisionmaking. Efforts should be made to enable them to be 
consulted at times when they are most lucid and most physically 
able. Physical frailty, coupled with the cognitive deficits of demen­
tia, may lead to significant dependency. In such circumstances, it 
is important to be especially sensitive to the risks of suggestibility 
and coercion.33 When decisions must be made, the tendency may be 
to bypass any participation by the patient at all, in the erroneous 
equation of dementia and incapacity.34 Even when patients are 
consulted, however, it is important to ascertain whether the choices 
expressed are the patients’ own, rather than choices pressed upon 
them by care-givers or expressed in the effort to please care-givers. 
One reported trial court decision explored the possibility that a grandson had exerted undue influence on his grandmother’s refusal 
of a tracheostomy, but concluded that she had decisionmaking 
capacity and that he had only made his views known to her and had 
not overreached for financial gain.35 Cultural factors or gender roles 
may also be evident when patients assume attitudes of deference.
In sum, a diagnosis of dementia by itself does not preclude 
meeting standards of legal competence. To be sure, patients with
31 See generally MALCOLM GOLDSMITH, HEARING THE VOICE OF PEOPLE WITH DEMENTIA; 
Opportunities and Obstacles (1996).35 Id.33 Fellows, supra note 27.
34 Fazel e t  al., supra note 9.35 Blackman v. New York City Health & Hosps. Corp., 660 N.Y.S.2d 643, 649 (Sup. Ct. 1997) (finding that dear and convincing evidence standard inapplicable v/hen patient has decisionmaking capacity).
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severe dementia are unlikely to meet these standards, but patients 
with early or mid-stage dementia might. Capacity should be 
assessed on a case-by-case basis, taking into account the patients 
abilities to understand and reason in the context of the decision at 
stake.
B. CREATING ADVANCE DIRECTIVES
A related issue, but one not identical to decisionmaking about 
care itself is whether patients with dementia have the legal power 
to create advance directives. The statutory standard for the power 
to make advance directives may differ from the standard for 
competence to make health-care decisions. It is possible for a 
patient to have the legal capacity to create an advance directive but 
to have been adjudicated incompetent for the purposes of making his 
or her own health-care decisions. It is also possible for the patient 
to have the legal power to make an advance directive that will come 
into play immediately by its terms in virtue of the patient’s evident 
incapacity to make health-care decisions themselves.36 One recent 
British study concluded that twenty percent of patients with early 
dementia were able to express reasoned treatment preferences with 
respect to clinical vignettes and that these capacities varied with 
intelligence.37
The common standard for creating an advance directive is 
testamentary capacity. The Uniform Rights of the Terminally 111 
Act Section 2, for example, provides that “[a]n individual of sound 
mind and [18] or more years of age” may make an advance 
directive,38 and many state statutes use comparable language. “Of 
sound mind” is the standard language for testamentary capacity, 
borrowed from probate codes and used in advance directive statutes 
without definition or further explanation.
The streamlined Uniform Health-Care Decisions Act Section 2,S9 
on the other hand, simply provides (without explanation) that “an
25 LlEBERSON, supra note 12, a t 735.
37 Fazel e t aL, supra note 9.
83 9B U.L-A. 175 (Supp. 2000).
23 See generally Charles P. Sabatino, The New Uniform Health Care Decisions A ct 
Paving a  Health Care Decisiom Superhighway?, 53 MD. L. REV. 1238 (1994).
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adult” can give advance instructions for health-care decisions by 
means of a range of advance directives.40 There are state advance 
directive statutes that do not use the language of probate; Oregon, 
for example, provides that a capable adult may execute a power of 
attorney for health care or a living will, but also provides no further 
explanation of its standard.41 Maine, in adopting the Uniform 
Health-Care Decisions Act, provided that the declarant must have 
capacity in a defined sense:
‘Capacity* means the ability to have a basic under­
standing of the diagnosed condition and to under­
stand the significant benefits, risks and alternatives 
to the proposed health care and the consequences of 
foregoing the proposed treatment, the ability to make 
and communicate a health care decision and the 
ability to understand the consequences of designating 
an agent or surrogate to make health-care decisions.42
“Testamentary capacity” requires that the testator be able to 
identify the natural objects of her bounty and their relationships to 
him, to recall the nature and extent of his property, and to dispose 
of his property understandingly. A determination of legal incompe­
tence in other respects and the appointment of a guardian or a 
conservator for financial matters does not preclude testamentary 
capacity, if  the testator meets these standards.43
There are clear analogies for advance directives to these stan­
dards for testamentary capacity. If a patient can understand the 
concept of a living will, the possibility of death, and the significance 
of turning down life-sustaining care, he would seem to have the 
capacity to make a living will. It is even more likely that a patient
40 9 U.L.A. 315 (Supp. 1999).
41 OR. Rev. STAT. § 127.510(1) (1991) (providing for “not incapable" adult execution).
43 ME. Rev. S ta t. ANN. tit. 18, § 5-801(c) (West 1998).
a  See, e.g., Burns v. Marshall, 767 So.2d 347, 352 (Ala. 2000); McKasson v. Hamric, 20 
S.W.3d 446, 450 (Ark. Ct. App. 2000); Pope v. Fields, 536 S.E.2d 740, 743 (Ga. 2000); In re 
Estate of Herbert, 979 P.2d 39 (Haw. 1999); Verdi v. Toland, 733 N.E.2d 25,28 (Ind. Ct. App. 
2000); In re Estate of Morris, No. A-99-028,2000 Neb. App. LEXIS 142, a t *13 (Neb. Ct. App. 
May 16,2000); Johnson v. Avery, No. 02A01-9803-CV-00079,1999 Tenn. App. LEXIS 394, at 
*9 (Tenn. Ct. App. June 22,1999); In re Estate of Schlueter, 994 P.2d 937,940*41 (Wyo. 2000).
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would have the capacity to appoint a special power of attorney for 
health care. Here, the understanding required would be the identity 
of the “natural” person to speak for him (perhaps a spouse or a 
child), the fact that important decisions about care are being made, 
and the result that the identified surrogate will make them for him. 
With such understanding, which seems possible when patients with 
dementia can still recognize loved ones and participate in relation­
ships, the power to appoint a surrogate decisionmaker would 
remain. Wary of possibilities of undue influence, however, North 
Dakota requires that when nursing home residents execute powers 
of attorney for health care, the execution must be witnessed by a 
religious representative, an attorney, or a patient advocate.44
When testamentary capacity is challenged, the burden of proof is 
on the challenger to show that the testator lacked capacity or was 
influenced unduly. The proof may be required to meet the prepon­
derance of the evidence standard, or it may be required to meet the 
higher clear and convincing evidence standard.45 There are 
apparently no reported adjudications of challenges to the capacity 
to create an advance directive. Courts that insist on dear and 
convincing evidence of a patient’s wishes before p ermitting termina­
tion of life-sustaining treatment might, however, insist on dear and 
convincing evidence of the capacity to make an advance directive as 
well.46 ,
II. D ecisionm aking  Abo u t  Care: Pr ec eden t  Autonom y
What Ronald Dworkin calls “precedent autonomy* allows a now- 
capable person to control decisionmaking at a later point in time 
when he no longer has the capacity to do so.47 There are several, 
importantly different arguments for the recognition of precedent 
autonomy. Most obviously, precedent autonomy recognizes the
u N.D. CENT. CODE §23-06.5-10(2) (1999).
45 See Cupples v. Pruitt, 754 So.2d 328, 333 (La. C t App. 2000) (applying d ea r and 
convincing evidence standard to determination of lack of testamentary capacity in challenge 
to will bequeathing property to blood relative).
45 LTEBERSON, supra note 12, a t 727.
47 Ronald Dworkin, Autonomy and the Demented Self, 64 MlLBANK Q. 4, 10 (Supp. 2 
1986).
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freedom of a person with present capacities to make plans for his 
own future. Second, it allows now-capable people to further their 
interests in determining how they will die, shaping the ends of their 
lives and how they will be remembered. Perhaps more controver­
sially, precedent autonomy may also be defended as the best way to 
give effect to whatever value autonomy continues to have for the 
later-incapacitated person about whose care decisions must be 
made. These arguments are different, and subject to different 
objections to the authority of precedent autonomy, as discussed in 
section III below.
Three standard legal methods further the exercise of precedent 
autonomy. A patient may prepare a living will. A patient may 
authorize a surrogate to make health-care decisions on his behalf, 
through creation of a special, durable power of attorney for health 
care (SPA). Or, a patient may have expressed his wishes in less 
formal ways, telling family members or friends what he would want 
to have done, in circumstances more or less well articulated. Such 
wishes might then be employed in a surrogate’s exercise of “substi­
tuted judgment,” with the surrogate deciding for the patient as it is 
thought the patient would have decided for himself. This section 
describes how these three forms of precedent autonomy operate; the 
following section discusses criticisms of their authority: whether 
they are really to be regarded as the exercise of autonomy, and 
whether they should control when they direct care that is at odds 
with the patient’s best interests at a later time.
A vast amount of law has contributed to the realization of 
precedent autonomy. Since 1976, the year in which In re Quinlan'18 
was decided and the California Natural Death Act49 was adopted, all 
states have adopted some form of advance directive statute. States 
were encouraged in this effort by Justice Sandra Day O’Connor’s 
concurring opinion in Cruzan v. Director,60 and by the ensuing 
federal Patient Self-Determination Act. Many states have also 
adopted statutes authorizing surrogates to exercise judgment on
48 In re Quinlan, 355 A.2d 647 (N.J. 1976).
Cal. Health & Safety Code § 85-7195 (West Supp. 1988) (repealed).
“  497 U.S. 261 (1990) (finding th a t if state insists on clear and convincing evidence of 
patient's wishes before permitting withdrawal of life-sustaining treatment, it is constitution­
ally required to provide patients with means of reaching this standard).
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behalf of the patient, when the patient has not executed a formal 
advance directive. These precedent autonomy statutes come in a 
myriad of varieties. Some follow the Uniform Rights of the Termi­
nally HI Act. A few others follow the more recent, more sweeping 
and integrated Uniform Health-Care Decisions Act. In addition to 
the statutes, a modest, but persisting number of court decisions 
address end of life care. What follows is a summary of major 
approaches and trends in the statutes and case law of particular 
relevance to patients with dementia.
A. “LIVING WILLS”
A “living will” is  a directive by a person concerning the care he 
would or would not want to have in future circumstances. It is the 
best known and most popular form of advance directive. But it  is 
not the best. Under most state statutes, living wills are of limited 
import and there is evidence that physicians do not follow them 
even when they are applicable.61 Even so, living wills can provide 
helpful guidance and moral support for surrogates seeking to make 
health-care decisions in accord with the patient’s prior wishes.62
A threshold standard for a living will or other advance directive 
to become operative is that the declarant no longer has the capacity 
to make current decisions with respect to his health care.63 The 
understanding of capacity and its application to patients with 
dementia was discussed in section I above. Advance directive 
statutes, however, frequently contain helpful reminders about what 
capacity means that are relevant to patients with dementia. The 
Uniform Health-Care Decisions Act Section 1(3) defines “capacity" 
as “an individual’s ability to understand the significant benefits, 
risks, and alternatives to proposed health care and can make and 
communicate a health-care decision.”54 Connecticut defines
BI LlEBERSON, supra note 12, § 9.7; David Orentlicher, The Illusion of Patient Choice in 
End-of-Life Decisions, 267 JAMA. 2101 (1992); Joan M. Teno e t aL, Do Advance Directives 
Provide Instructions that Direct Care?, 45 J. AM. GERIATRICS SOC’Y 60S (1997).
52 MEISEL, supra note 12, § 10.3.
53 E.g., Uniform  R igh ts o f  th e  T erm inally  I I I  A ct § 2(b)(c), 9B UJLA. 176 (Supp. 
2000).
54 9, Part IB, U.LA. 148 (2000).
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incapacity as “being unable to understand and appreciate the nature 
and consequences of health-care decisions, including the benefits 
and disadvantages of such treatment, and to reach and communi­
cate an informed decision regarding the treatment[.]”66 Kentucky’s 
statute likewise includes both understanding and communication.80 
Maryland includes both understanding and communication, and 
specifies that communication may be by means other than speech.67 
Oregon adds that communication may be through an intermediary 
familiar with the principal’s manner of communicating.88 New 
Jersey specifies that capacity be assessed relative to particular 
decisions.69
A further limit under most statutes is that living wills do not 
become effective until the patient meets a specified requirement as 
to his or her medical condition. Under the most stringent statutes, 
the patient must be “terminally ill.” Definitions of terminal illness 
typically include only the end stage of the dying process. The 
Uniform Rights of the Terminally 111 Act Section 1(9) for example, 
defines a terminal condition as “an incurable and irreversible 
condition that, without the administration of life-sustaining 
treatment, will, in  the opinion of the attending physician, result in 
death within a relatively short time.”60 Utah’s living will statute 
has perhaps the most impressively limited definition of terminal 
condition: a condition that “regardless of the application of life- 
sustaining procedures, would within reasonable medical judgment 
produce death, and where the application of life-sustaining proce­
dures serve only to postpone the moment of death of the person.”61 
North Dakota’s statute, like Utah’s, is severely time-limited: an 
“incurable or irreversible condition which, without the administra­
tion of life-prolonging treatment, will result in my imminent 
death.”62 Connecticut’s statute refers to end-stage disease: “the 
final stage of an incurable or irreversible medical condition which,
“  Conn. Gen. Stat. § l9a-570(6) (1999).
66 1997 Ky. Rev. Stat. & R. Serv. 311.621(5) (Banks-Baldwin).
57 Md. Code Ann., H ealth-Gen. I § 5-6010) (1999).
“  Or. Rev. Stat. § 127.505(13) (1998).
59 N. J. Stat. Ann. § 26:2H-55 (West 1996).
60 9B U.L.A. 174 (Supp. 2000).
61 Utah Code Ann . § 75-2-1103(10) (2000).
62 N.D. Cent. Code § 23-06.4-03(3) (2000).
H e i n O n l i n e  - -  35 Ga . L. R e v . 5 54  2 0 0 0 - 2 0 0 1
2001] DECISIONMAKING AT THE END OF LIFE 555
without the administration of a life support system, will result in 
death within a relatively short time, in the opinion of the attending 
physician[.]”63 None of these definitions encompass patients during 
the long downhill course of dementia. Alzheimer’s patients might, 
however, meet less time-restrictive statutes such as New Jersey’s, 
which sets no outer limit but presumes that a life span of six months 
or less is terminal.64
Some living will statutes add persistent vegetative state or 
persistent coma to terminal illness as a condition that triggers 
efficacy of a living will.65 Even Alzheimer’s patients with severely 
diminished capacities are unlikely to meet this standard, hov/ever.
Still other states expand living wills to include conditions from 
which the patient will not recover. Florida, for example, extends 
advance directive statutes to an end stage condition “caused by 
injury, disease, or illness which has resulted in severe and perma­
nent deterioration, indicated by incapacity and complete physical 
dependency, and for which, to a reasonable degree of medical 
certainty, treatment of the irreversible condition would be medically 
ineffective.”66 Oregon allows a patient to give directions for a 
“progressive illness that will be fatal and is in an advanced stage” 
when improvement is “very unlikely.”67 These descriptions would 
seem to include the later stages of dementia.
Finally, the Uniform Health-Care Decisions Act Section 4 
eliminates the requirement of a triggering medical condition 
altogether.68 In states following the Uniform Act, living wills apply 
to any patient lacking capacity, regardless of the stage of disease.
Advance directive statutes adopted before Cruzan69 frequently 
prohibited patients from refusing medically-provided nutrition and 
hydration by means of advance directives, or singled out nutrition 
and hydration for special treatment. These requirements have been 
largely eliminated. There are exceptions, however. Missouri’s
63 Conn. Gen. Stat. Ann. § 19a-570(3) (West 1997).
61 N.J. STAT. ANN. § 26:2H-55 (West 1996).
65 E.g., O.C.G.A. § 31-32-3 (2000); UTAH CODE ANN. § 75-2-1104 (2000).
65 FLA STAT. ANN. ch. 765.101(4) (Harrison 1999).
67 Or. REV. STAT. § 127.531 (1998).
63 9, Part IB, U.KA. 157 (2000).
63 Cruzan v. Director, 497 U.S. 261 (1990).
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advance directive statute still prohibits the use of advance directives 
to forego nutrition or hydration.70 Oregon singles out nutrition,and 
hydration for a separate decision by the patient and otherwise 
prohibits its withdrawal unless it is not medically feasible or would 
cause severe pain.71 Oklahoma requires specific authorization by 
the declarant for nutrition and hydration to be included in the life- 
sustaining treatment that is refused by a directive.72 Medically- 
assisted nutrition and hydration may be an issue in the care of 
Alzheimer’s patients nearing the end of life, although recent studies 
have questioned its therapeutic efficacy.73
B. SPECIAL POWERS OF ATTORNEY FOR HEALTH CARE
A second type of advance directive is the special, durable power 
of attorney for health care. There are two importantly different 
senses in which the SPA may be thought of as exercising precedent 
autonomy. The creation of an SPA is a direct exercise of precedent 
autonomy in that the patient chooses his decisionmaker. To the 
extent that the SPA also attempts to choose as the patient would 
have chosen for himself in the current situation, the SPA may be 
viewed as exercising precedent autonomy indirectly. Part III below 
argues that criticisms of precedent autonomy are more telling 
against the second than against the first sense in which the SPA 
involves precedent autonomy.74
The SPA has several advantages over the living will. Most 
obvious is flexibility: the SPA can respond to medical circumstances 
that were not anticipated by the patient in drafting a living will.75 
Another advantage is that the SPA gives the patient an identified 
advocate. The SPA may be able to speak forcefully on behalf of the 
patient to health-care providers who might otherwise be unwilling 
to follow or to interpret an advance directive.
70 MO. ANN. Stat. § 459.010(3) (West 1992).
71 Or. Rev. Stat. §§ 127.531,127.580 (1998).
72 Okla. Stat. A n n .  tit. 63, § 3103.3(6) (West 1999).
73 Thomas E. Finucane & Colleen Christmas, More Caution About Tube Feeding, 48 J. 
Am. G eria trics  so c ’y  1167 (2000); Thomas E. Finucane et al., Tube Feeding in Patients with 
Advanced Dementia; A  Review of the Evidence, 282 JAMA 1365 (1999).
74 Infra notes 129-70 and accompanying text.
75 MEISEL, supra note 12, § 10.4.
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In many states, an additional advantage of the SPA over the 
living will is that it does not limit applicability by triggering medical 
conditions, except incapacity itself.76 The Uniform Rights of the 
Terminally III Act Section 2(c), however, does limit SPAs to 
terminally ill patients, apparently because the SPA was added as a 
later amendment to its living will provisions.77 A few states likewise 
impose condition limits on the actions of the SPA. Oklahoma, for 
example, will only allow termination of life-sustaining treatment by 
an SPA when the patient is terminally ill or in a persistent coma.78 
In such states, the SPA does not have applicability advantages over 
a living will for patients with dementia.
Despite these advantages, there are difficulties in the use of 
SPAs that may be particularly relevant to the circumstances of 
patients with dementia. No willing or appropriate proxy might be 
available. An appointed proxy might himself become incompetent 
or debilitated; this is especially likely to be a problem when elderly 
couples give health-care proxies to each other.
Of perhaps most concern, the appointed SPA might make 
decisions that subordinate the patient to the needs and concerns of 
others. Such concerns might be financial—the dissipation of an 
estate, or emotional—exhaustion by the burdens of care. The 
Uniform Health-Care Decisions Act Section 4 sets out the duties of 
the SPA to make patient-centered decisions, in accord with the 
patient’s wishes to the extent known, or the patient’s best interests 
to the extent wishes are unknown.79 Many state statutes impose 
similar guidance on SPAs.80 Finally, an appointed proxy might 
overreach or act in bad faith. A few state statutes specify that a 
proxy’s actions may be challenged on this basis;81 other states might 
permit such challenges despite the absence of specific statutory 
authorization for them. A number of states require special safe­
guards when SPAs are appointed by patients in nursing homes, and
"e E.g., ARIZ. Rev. STAT. ANN. § 36-3224 (West 2000); N.D. CENT. CODE § 233-06.5-17 
(2000).
77 9B U.L.A. 176 (Supp. 2000).
78 Okla. Stat. Ann . tit. 63, § 3101.4 (West 1999).
79 9, P art IB, U .L A  159 (2000).
80 MEISEL, supra note 12, § 12.2, n.120.
81 E.g., O r. Rev. S ta t.  § l27.550(l)(b) (1998).
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prohibit health-care providers or employees of health-care facilities 
from service in the capacity of SPA.
C. CONFLICTS BETWEEN LIVING WILLS AND THE DIRECTIVES OF POWERS 
OF ATTORNEY: THE PROBLEM OF PRIORITY
Many state advance directive statutes authorize both living wills 
and SPAs without any comment about how the two fit together. 
Hopefully, the choices of the SPA will not conflict with the directions 
in a living will. But it is certainly possible for the two to be in 
apparent conflict, if the SPA believes that a treatment refusal in a 
living will conflicts with the patient’s values or interests. When the 
conflict arises between a general refusal of treatment in a living will 
and the SPA’s response to specific, unanticipated circumstances, it 
may be only apparent. When the SPA believes that a specific 
advance directive should not be followed in the patient’s current 
circumstances, however, the conflict is very real.
The few state advance directive statutes that anticipate such 
conflicts resolve them in several different ways. In Florida, the 
holder of the SPA is directed to be guided by a living will, if there is 
one.82 This approach is justified if the living will is thought to be a 
better indication of the patient’s precedent autonomy, but it loses 
the SPA’s advantage of flexibility. Several states provide that the 
most recent directive prevails.83 This approach makes sense on the 
assumption that the later expression better reflects current choices. 
Utah resolves disputes in favor of the directions of the SPA.84 This 
approach allows the SPA, who is the principal’s chosen agent, to 
respond to changed circumstances, but it has the risk that the SPA 
might ignore the patient’s antecedent choices.
The Uniform Health-Care Decisions Act Section 4 lets the patient 
coordinate directions to an SPA with a living will.85 It assigns the 
SPA authority to make all health-care decisions, unless the patient 
specifies otherwise. This approach to conflicts may be most
82 Fla. Stat. Ann . ch. 765.304 (Harrison 2000).
83 Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 36-3209 (West 2000); N.D. Cent. Code § 23-06.6-13 (1991); 
Okla. Stat. Ann. tit. 63, § 3101.6 (West 1997).
84 Utah Code Ann . § 75-2-1106(2) (1993).
85 9, Part IB, U.L.A. 156 (2000).
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reflective of patients’ choices, but has the disadvantage of inflexibil­
ity when patients place limits on the SPA and unforeseen circum­
stances arise.
D. DECISIONMAKING ABOUT CARE: CURRENT PREFERENCES AND THE 
REVOCATION OF ADVANCE DIRECTIVES
All advance directive statutes provide that the current wishes of 
a patient with decisional capacity govern care decisions, and that 
advance directives may be revoked. Many also provide that current 
wishes control and that directives may be revoked even when 
patients lack decisional capacity. Patients with dementia pose 
difficult issues about revocations. Although lacking decisional 
capacity, they may express wishes that are in apparent conflict with 
advance directives or that are difficult to interpret. Agitation, 
combativeness, and suspicion of others may accompany dementia. 
Persons with advancing dementia may forget family members or 
friends and identify with others, apparently rejecting the ministra­
tions of an SPA or a family surrogate and evidencing the desire to 
rely on someone else as a decisionmaker instead.
Many state advance directive statutes allow the contemporane­
ous desires of an incapacitated person to override a living will.86 
Apparent expressions of wishes may be difficult to interpret, 
however, depending on the patient’s level of incapacity. A patient 
with dementia who had previously expressed the desire to have all 
possible life-sustaining treatment and who rejects food and attempts 
to dislodge a feeding tube is sometimes interpreted as desiring that 
nutritional support be ceased. Conversely, a patient who had 
declined all life-sustaining treatment but who apparently enjoys his 
present circumstances is sometimes interpreted as wanting 
treatment to continue or at least being indifferent to its continua­
tion.87 Whether these interpretations are accurate reflections of
86 M eisel, supra note 12, § 10.14, n.135.
87 See Rebecca Dresser, Life, Death, and Incompetent Patients: Conceptual Infirmities 
and Hidden Values in the Law, 28 AH1Z. L. Rev. 373,377-78 (1986) (discussing In re Spring, 
405 N.E.2d 115 (1980)).
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preferences or external constructions is disputed; the character and 
significance of these disputes is discussed in Part III below.
By far the majority of advance directive statutes treat the 
creation and revocation of advance directives asymmetrically, 
requiring capacity for the former but not for the latter. Despite 
specifying that a declarant be “of sound mind” to create an advance 
directive, the Uniform Rights of the Terminally 111 Act Section 4 
provides for revocation “at any time and in any manner, without 
regard to the declarant’s mental or physical condition.”88 The 
Uniform Health-Care Decisions Act Section 3 likewise allows 
anyone to revoke regardless of capacity.89 This Act, however, places 
barriers in the way of revoking a power of attorney that it does not 
impose on revoking a care directive. A power of attorney can only 
be revoked by a signed writing or by personally informing the 
supervising health-care provider. Other directives can be revoked 
“at any time and in any manner that communicates an intent to 
revoke.”90
There are exceptions to asymmetry of revocation. Maine and 
New Mexico, in adopting the UHCDA, limit revocation to individu­
als “with capacity.”91 North Dakota also limits revocation to 
competent patients.92 Oregon has an unusual variant of asymmetry: 
a directive refusing nutrition and hydration can be revoked by a 
principal regardless of capacity, but other directives require capacity 
to revoke.93
The principal argument for asymmetry of revocation is the desire 
to honor the patient’s current wishes, regardless of expression of 
precedent choice. There are notable problems, however, in applying 
asymmetry of revocation of patients with dementia. Apparent 
expressions of wishes may be difficult to interpret and to dis­
aggregate from symptoms such as agitation, depression, or para­
noia. Loss of memory and the inability to remember family and
88 9B U.L.A. 181 (Supp. 2000).
83 9, P art IB, U.L. A. 155 <2000).
80 Id.
91 Me. Rev. Stat. Ann. tit. 18-A, § 5-803 (West 1998); N.M. STAT. Ann. § 24-7A-3(A) 
(Michie 2000).
92 N.D. CENT. Code § 23-06.4-05 (1991 & Supp. 1999).
93 OH. Rev. Stat. § 127.545(1) (Supp. 1998).
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Mends may lead to apparent revocations of SPAs, even when the 
SPA was originally chosen by the patient, has long-standing 
knowledge of the patient’s values, and continues to care for the 
patient. Finally, the irony of allowing asymmetry of revocation is 
that a patient might be able to revoke an advance directive, but be 
left without the power to create a new one. The result would be 
either to leave the patient in a decisionmaking vacuum, or to defer 
to precedent autonomy without a formal advance directive or to the 
best interests standard. In states with a surrogate consent statute, 
the SPA might in any event be one of the listed statutory surrogates. 
One recommendation to draw from this confusion is reconsideration 
of whether incapacitated patients should be able to revoke SPAs to 
the same extent they are able to revoke living wills. An alternative 
would be to require capacity for the revocation of an SPA, unless 
there are additional grounds for challenging whether the SPA is 
acting in good faith. PART III below argues that the criticisms of 
precedent autonomy apply with more plausibility to living wills than 
to the selection of SPAs.94
E. PRECEDENT AUTONOMY WITHOUT FORMAL ADVANCE DIRECTIVES: 
THE USE OF SUBSTITUTED JUDGMENT
Despite widespread publicity, living wills and SPAs are not used 
by the majority of Americans. Even when a living will exists, it may 
be inapplicable or too general to direct care in the specific circum­
stances of the patient’s case. To fill in the breach, about half of the 
states have adopted surrogate consent statutes. New Jersey, for 
example, provides that when an instruction directive is not specific 
to the patient’s condition, surrogates should be consulted for a 
reasonable understanding of the patient’s wishes.95 These statutes 
authorize a prioritized list of decisionmakers to act on the patient’s 
behalf: the SPA, a court appointed guardian, followed by family 
members in order of degree of relationship. Some statutes also 
include close friends at the end of the list. For example, Florida 
adds to the list “close personal fnend,” defined as:
94 Infra notes 129-70 and accompanying tex t
53 N.J. STAT. ANN. § 26:2H-64(b) (West 199S).
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any person 18 years of age or older who has exhibited 
special care and concern for the patient, and who 
presents an affidavit to the health care facility or to 
the attending or treating physician stating that he or 
she is a friend of the patient; is willing and able to 
become involved in the patient’s health care; and has 
maintained such regular contact with the patient so 
as to be familiar with the patient’s activities, health, 
and religious or moral beliefs.96
In the absence of family members, the Uniform Health-Care 
Decisions Act and states following it allow any adult “who has 
exhibited special care and concern for the patient, who is familiar 
with the patient’s personal values, and who is reasonably available" 
to act as a surrogate.97
Some of these statutes impose limits on when listed surrogates 
may act and on what they may do. The Uniform Rights of the 
Terminally 111 Act Section 7 limits the surrogate’s authority to 
terminal illness, but contains this limit in virtue of drafting the 
surrogacy provision into an already-limited format.98 Maine limits 
the power of the statutory list of surrogates to the following 
procedures: “a surrogate may not deny surgery, procedures or other 
interventions that are lifesaving and medically necessary [where a] 
medically necessary procedure is one providing the most patient- 
appropriate intervention or procedure that can be safely and 
effectively given.”99 Other surrogacy statutes give more general 
directions to the surrogate to act in accord with the patient’s wishes 
or interests.
Even without statutory authorization of listed surrogates, or 
formal appointment of a guardian, surrogate decisionmakers may 
have the legal power to make decisions on behalf of incapacitated 
patients. Advance directive statutes complement underlying
98 FLA. Stat. ANN. ch. 765.101(3) (Harrison 2000).
97 Uniform  H ealth -C are  Decisions A ct § 5(c), 9 U.L.A. 167 (1993); see, e.g., Me. Rev. 
S ta t. ANN. tit. 18-A, § 5-805(C) (West 1998) (Mowing UCHDA). 
ss 9B U.L.A. 184 (Supp. 2000).
99 Me . rev. Stat. ANN. tit. 18-A, § 5-805(a) (West Supp. 2000).
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common law and constitutional rights.100 They give patients and 
physicians new assurances: patients have a formal means for 
expressing their wishes, and physicians have a shield against legal 
liability.101 Oklahoma’s statute, for example, puts forth as a goal 
keeping these “highly sensitive, personal issues” away from 
courts.102 Many other state statutes are explicit that the rights 
given in them are cumulative upon common law and constitutional 
rights.103
Unlike the SPA, the surrogates discussed in this section cannot 
be regarded as exercising precedent autonomy in the sense that they 
have been chosen by the patient. Instead, their exercise of prece­
dent autonomy is at best indirect, as they attempt to decide as the 
patient would have chosen for him or herself. Some critics of the 
substituted judgment standard regard this indirection as critical: 
if the surrogate has not been chosen by the patient and if  the patient 
has not stated his or her choices for the situation at hand, how can 
substituted judgment be regarded as autonomy at all?104 Both the 
litigated cases and the statutes struggle with the substantive 
standard to be applied to decisions based on substituted judgment. 
To the extent possible, surrogates are to try to choose as the patient 
would have chosen under the circumstances given his values and 
interests. The term “substituted judgment’ has been used to 
describe this process; but it is misleading if it is taken to suggest 
that the surrogate should “substitute” his judgment for the pa­
tient’s. Instead, what is “substituted” is the surrogate as processor, 
applying the patient’s values to the problem at hand.105 When 
evidence of the patient’s values is lacking, statutes and case law 
require the surrogate to base decisions on the patient’s best 
interests.106 A widely emulated New Jersey case sets out a three­
tiered structure: the substituted judgment standard, a “limited 
objective test” in which the surrogate follows limited evidence of the
100 David Orentlicher, The Limits of Legislation, 53 Md. L. Rev. 1255 (1994).
101 M eisel, supra note 12, § 10.12, n.100 (citing statutory provisions to this effect).
102 OKLA. STAT. ANN. t i t  63, § 3101.2(A)(3) (West 1997).
103 E.g., O.C.GA § 31-32-11(a) (1996).
104 E.g., Personal Communication with Teresa Collett, Joint Conference on Legal/Ethical 
Issues in  the Progression of Dementia, Athens, Ga., 2000.
105 See infra Part III (criticizing this process as precedent autonomy).
105 Infra Part IV.
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patient’s wishes to discontinue care when the burdens of care clearly 
outweigh its benefits to the patient, and an “objective” best interests 
standard.107
The litigated cases also have struggled with the evidentiary 
standard to apply to these surrogate decisionmakers. While the 
prevailing view is that lesser evidentiary standards are required,108 
a few jurisdictions have insisted on the more stringent clear and 
convincing evidence standard.109 Connecticut provides for the more 
stringent standard in its surrogacy statute: “[w]ith respect to any 
communication of a patient’s wishes other than by means of a 
document executed in accordance with section 19a-575a the court 
shall consider whether there is clear and convincing evidence of 
such communication.”110 In Cruzan,111 the Supreme Court held that 
insistence on the more stringent standard does not impinge on an 
arguable constitutional liberty right of the patient to refuse 
unwanted medical care.112
A few quite recent, reported decisions take up the evidentiary 
standard required for discontinuation of life-sustaining treatment 
when a patient is neither terminally ill nor in a persistent vegeta­
tive state. These cases speak to the situations of many dementia 
patients. In Martin v. Martin,113 the Michigan Supreme Court held 
that clear and convincing evidence of prior wishes is required to 
remove a life-sustaining feeding tube from a patient with severe 
cognitive impairments.114 Michael Martin suffered a closed head 
injury in an automobile accident, which left him unable to care for 
himself or interact with his environment in more than minimal 
ways.115 Five years later, his wife, formally appointed as legal 
guardian, sought authorization to remove medically-assisted 
nutrition, relying on testimony about his expressed wishes before
107 In re Conroy, 486 A.2d 1209 (N.J. 1985).
103 See, e.g., In re Lawrance, 579 N.E.2d 32 (Ind. 1991).
109 In re Westchester County Med. Ctr., 531 N.E.2d 607 (N.Y. 1988).
1,0 CONN. Gen. Stat. § 19a-580(c) (1997).
111 Cruzan v. Director, 497 U.S. 261 (1990).
112 Id. a t  261.
1,3 538 N.W.2d 399 (Mich. 1995).
114 Id. a t  410.
116 Medical testimony was divided on whether he was capable of any meaningful 
interaction a t all, even of the most minimal sort. Id. a t 402-03.
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the accident. His mother and sister opposed the discontinuation. 
The Michigan court applied the clear and convincing evidence 
standard and concluded that it was not met by the evidence in 
Martin’s case.116 In the court’s words, “[o]nly when the patients 
prior statements clearly illustrate a serious, well thought out, 
consistent decision to refuse treatment under these exact circum­
stances, or circumstances highly similar to the current situation, 
should treatment be refused or withdrawn.”117 Martin’s statements 
that he would not want to live like a vegetable, made when he was 
young and healthy, were in the court’s judgment too remote from his 
present circumstances to provide clear and convincing evidence of 
his preferences under the current circumstances.118 The court 
reached this conclusion despite testimony that some of Martin’s 
comments had been made with respect to young people or accident 
victims, and had rejected severe dependency as well as life in a 
persistent vegetative state.119
In a second such case, the Wisconsin Supreme Court refused to 
allow a guardian to withdraw nutritional support from a patient 
with Alzheimer’s dementia.120 Edna F. was described by the court 
as responsive to stimuli and bedridden.121 Her sister, who was her 
court-appointed guardian, sought withdrawal of the feeding tube; 
the sister’s only evidence of Edna’s wishes was a statement made 
nearly thirty years earlier to the effect that she would rather die of 
cancer than lose her mind. The nursing home’s ethics committee 
had approved the withdrawal provided no family member objected; 
a niece, however, refused to sign an approval required by the 
facility. Distinguishing an earlier case which had permitted 
withdrawal of a feeding tube from a patient in a persistent vegeta­
tive state, the Wisconsin court applied a presumption that continu­
ing life was in Edna F.’s best interests so long as she was not in a
116 I d  a t  411.
117 Id.
m  Id.
m  Id. a t  413.
120 In re Guardianship of Edna M.F., 663 N.W.2d 485 (Wis. 1997).
121 Id. a t  487. A concurring opinion added that she was utterly dependent, showed no 
purposeful responses to stimuli, and was immobile with limb contractures. Id. a t 499*500 
(Abrahamson, C.J., concurring).
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persistent vegetative state.122 Through the court-appointed 
guardian ad litem agreed with Edna F.’s sister that withdrawal of 
the feeding tube was appropriate, the court refused to authorize 
discontinuation of the feeding tube without clear and convincing 
evidence of her wishes, an evidentiary standard not met by state­
ments remote in  time and in circumstance.123
A similar case is currently under review by the California 
Supreme Court.124 Injured in an automobile accident, Robert 
Wendland was comatose for 16 months and thereafter minimally 
able to interact with his environment. Two years after the accident, 
his wife Rose, as his conservator, sought removal of nutrition and 
hydration; her request was opposed by his mother and sister. The 
probate court refused to grant Rose Wendland’s request, concluding 
that although there was clear and convincing evidence that she was 
acting in good faith, clear and convincing evidence of his wishes was 
lacking. The appellate court reversed on the ground that under the 
California Probate Code Section 2355 the conservator is required to 
act in good faith but not to provide clear and convincing evidence of 
the patient’s wishes.126 Further, the court distinguished Martin and 
Edna F. on statutory grounds.126 Briefing for the Wendland review 
has just been completed.
Application of the clear and convincing evidence standard to the 
use of substituted judgment to discontinue life-sustaining treatment 
in a non-PVS patient is indicative of heightened judicial concern 
about such decisions. Section III turns to the justifiability of these 
concerns.127 Section IV takes up the best interests standard and is 
critical of the presumption, applied by the Wisconsin court, that 
continued life-sustaining treatment is always in the best interest of 
a patient who is not terminally ill or in a persistent vegetative 
state.128
122 Id. a t 491-92 (distinguishing In re Guardianship of L.W., 482 N.W.2d 60 (Wis. 1992)).
123 Id. a t 492.
124 Wendland v. Wendland, 93 CaL Rptr. 2d 550 (Cal. Ct. App. 2000), review granted and 
opinion superseded by, In re Conservatorship of Wendland, 2 P.3d 1065 (CaL 2000).
125 Id. a t 553-54.
12S Id, a t  567-68.
127 See infra notes 129-70 and accompanying tex t
128 See infra notes 171-219 and accompanying text.
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III. T h e  Authority  of Precedent  A utonom y
Despite the many advance directive statutes and court decisions 
supporting them, doubts continue to be expressed about the 
justifiability of relying on precedent autonomy. Although courts 
insist on the clearest of evidence, and statutes require even chosen 
surrogate decisionmakers to take into account both an incapacitated 
patient’s wishes and his best interests, there is evidence that 
physicians ignore advance directives in light of what they think 
might be best for the patient, and there is evidence that patients 
sometimes want physicians to act in this manner. Staunch 
defenders of advance directives deplore these departures from 
precedent autonomy. But critics argue that they reflect appropriate 
concerns about the authority of precedent autonomy when its 
exercise conflicts with the apparent expressed wishes or the best 
interests of an incapacitated person. These criticisms of precedent 
autonomy have particular force for patients with dementia when 
their illness assumes a long and fluctuating downhill course. Such 
patients may anticipate extended periods of limited capacity or full 
incapacitation.
A. VAGUENESS AND INACCURACY
Whether formal or informal, advance directives may not be very 
specific. Laving wills may simply specify refusal of “life-sustaining 
care” or “extraordinary treatment.” Comments to family and 
friends, such as “I don’t want to live like that” or “I don’t want to be 
dependent on machines” may not speak to the patient’s condition, 
treatments, or prognosis. A living will is at least drafted with the 
intent of governing end-of-life decisionmaking; remarks to family 
and friends may be made without any intent that they be taken as 
guidance. There is thus reason to doubt that even living wills and 
surely remarks in  casual conversation are actually precedent choices 
for particular choices about patient care.129 Lynn et aL suggest that
129 See Rebecca S. Dresser, Autonomy Revisited: The Limits of Anticipatory Choices, in 
Dementia and Aging: Ethics, Values, and Policy Choices 71 (Robert H. Binatock et aL 
eds., 1992)
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vagueness can be grounded theoretically: People who are in good 
health may have no well-developed preferences about what they 
would want were they to become ill, for such preferences are formed 
in interaction with ongoing experiences of illness and in dialogue 
with others.130
One empirical study questions whether statements in a general 
living will are consistent with patients’ preferences for specific life- 
sustaining procedures under a variety of health scenarios.181 
Another study casts doubt on whether choices can be generalized 
from one health-care situation to another. Reilly, Teasdale & 
McCullough interviewed a sample of 218 community-dwelling elders 
with regard to their preferences for a range of life-sustaining 
treatments under four different health-care scenarios.132 Their four 
scenarios were sudden life threatening illness with some possibility 
of return to current health status, terminal illness, persistent coma, 
and acute illness for a patient with “moderately advanced Alzhei­
mer’s” (described as no longer allowing independence, but allowing 
interaction with family and friends). Respondents were most likely 
to choose interventions in the first scenario (12% never, 52% trial 
and 36% always) and least likely to do so for persistent coma (62% 
never, 28% trial, and 11% always).133 Responses for acute illness for 
a patient with moderately advanced Alzheimer’s were more divided 
(43% never, 36% trial and 21% always), with a majority of inter­
viewees preferring less invasive interventions for this scenario, such 
as hospital admission (74%) and antibiotics (73%).134 In response, 
Volicer & Hurley note that this study is limited to extrapolation 
from one scenario to another, and caution that it should not be 
characterized as invalidating more general directives in living
568 GEORGIA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 35:539
180 Joanne Lynn et aL, Dementia and Advance-Care Planning: Perspectives from Three 
Countries on Ethics and Epidemiology, 10 J. CLINICAL ETHICS 271,273 (1999).
131 Lawrence J . Schneiderman et al., Relationship of General Advance Directive 
Instructions to SpecificLife-Sustaining Treatment Preferences in Patients with Serious Illness, 
152 Archives Internal Med. 2114 (1992).
132 Rebecca B. Reilly et aL, Projecting Patients'Preferences from Living Wills: An Invalid 
Strategy for Management of Dementia with Life-Threatening Illness, 42 J. Am. GERIATRICS 
SOC’Y 997 (1994).
133 Id. a t 1000.
134 Id.
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wills.135 Contrary to the study just described, a smaller study 
recently concluded that cognitively normal older adults would be 
less likely to opt for invasive interventions (CPR, ventilator support, 
or tube feeding) for patients with moderate dementia, and that 95% 
would reject more invasive interventions for patients with severe 
dementia.136 This later study also identified a positive association 
between the desire for life-sustaining treatment and less education, 
greater independence, and a higher perceived quality of life.
Fazel, Hope & Jacoby, in a sample of patients from Oxford, 
England, found a positive association between preferences for 
treatment intervention and cognitive impairment.187 They suggest 
three explanations. First, cognitively impaired patients may have 
more limited understanding of the consequences of their decisions. 
Second, they may be more willing to defer to medical authority. 
Most critical of precedent autonomy is their third explanation: 
“people who already have cognitive impairment may put a higher 
value on their life than the value that people without cognitive 
impairment put on their future hypothetical life with dementia.”133
If there is reason to doubt the meaning of patients’ prior state­
ments, there may be even more reason to doubt the accuracy of 
surrogates’ predictions of what patients would choose. Leaving 
aside the possibility that surrogates might engage in intentional or 
careless m i s r e p r e s e n t a t i o n ,  there is evidence that they are at best 
imperfect predictors of what their loved ones would choose. 
Sulmasy et al. report 66% accuracy in surrogates’ predictions about 
what patients with a predicted less than 50% chance of two-year 
survival would choose for end-of-life care in several scenarios.139 
Other findings were as follows: accuracy was less for the scenario
135 Ladislar Volicer & Ann Hurley, Protecting Self-Determination of Dementia Patients, 
43 J . Am. G e r i a t r i c s  Soc’y 938,938-39 (1995).
135 Dwenda K. Gjerdingen et aL, Older Persons* Opinions About Life-Sustaining 
Procedures in the Face of Dementia, 8  ARCHIVES FAM. Med. 421 (1999).
137 Seena Fazel e t aL, Effect of Cognitive Impairment and Premorbid Intelligence on 
Treatment Preferences for Life-Sustaining Medical Therapy, 157 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 1009, 
1011 (2000).
133 Id. . . .
139 Daniel P. Sulmasy e t aL, The Accuracy of Substituted Judgments in Patients with 
Terminal Diagnoses, 128 ANNALS INTERNAL M ed. 621 (1998); see also Daniel P. Sulmasy et 
aL,MoreTalk, Less Paper: Predicting the Accuracy of Substituted Judgments, 96 AM. J. MED. 
432 (1994).
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of severe dementia than for the scenario of permanent coma; 
accuracy was greatest for invasive procedures such as ventilator 
care (84%); accuracy was also greater for more highly educated 
surrogates and patients, and for surrogates who had conducted 
explicit discussions with patients; surprisingly, religiosity was 
negatively associated with accuracy; furthermore, there was no 
significant difference in accuracy between the predictions of 
patients’ chosen surrogates and the predictions of surrogates 
provided for in standard statutory lists.140
Another quite small study of the decisions that would be made 
prospectively by spouses of patients with Alzheimer’s disease found 
them far more likely to withhold care in cases of coma than in cases 
of critical illness.141 As in the Sulmasy study, spouses in this study 
were far more willing to withhold invasive therapies such as CPR 
and ventilator support than antibiotics. These judgments were 
based on perceptions of patients’ interests and quality of life 
independent of cognitive status. There was a slight association 
between spouses perceiving themselves as more burdened and being 
less willing to forego life-sustaining care.142
Several studies of health-care providers suggest they are not good 
predictors of patients’ preferences either. In an initial study of this 
question, Uhlmann, Pearlman & Cain found that physicians and 
nurses were no better than chance in predicting patients preferences 
for resuscitation,143 In a later study, Uhlmann and Pearlman 
provided this possible explanation: Physicians rank the quality of 
life of their chronically ill patients as lower than their patients do; 
and physicians are more likely than patients to associate perceived 
quality of life with attitudes towards life-sustaining treatment.144
Although the studies are limited, these data suggest reason for 
concern about extrapolating decisions regarding current care from
140 Sulmasy et aL, The Accuracy of Substituted Judgments in Patients with Terminal 
Diagnoses, supra note 139f a t 625-26.
141 Mathy Mezey et al.f Life-Sustaining Treatment Decisions by Spouses of Patients with 
Alzheimer's Disease, 44 J . AM. GERIATRICS S0C*Y 144 (1996).
142 Id. at 148-49.
143 Richard F. Uhlmann et al., Understanding of Elderly Patients' Resuscitation 
Preferences by Physicians and Nurses, 150 W. J. Med. 705 (1989).
144 R.F. Uhlmann & RA. Pearlman, Perceived Quality of Life and Preferences for Life• 
Sustaining Treatment in Older Adults, 151 ARCHIVES INTERNAL MED. 495, 497 (1991).
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patients’ prior choices about other circumstances or surrogates’ 
beliefs about what these choices would be. If precedent autonomy 
means relying on prior reasoned directives to govern present 
choices, it is not furthered by inaccurate extrapolations. Risks of 
inaccuracy, however, appear to be lower for more invasive forms of 
care and to be reduced significantly by discussion and communica­
tion. Concerns about accuracy do not, therefore, entail rejection of 
the authority of precedent autonomy altogether. Instead, they 
suggest increased efforts to encourage communication about 
preferences and care in scrutinizing the evidence, with particular 
attention to the extent to which reports about preferences are 
grounded in discussions of particular circumstances.
B. PREFERENCE INSTABILITY
The likelihood that patients will change their minds about care 
decisions is another basis for challenging the authority of advance 
directives. Several studies have explored the stability of antecedent 
preferences. Everhart and Pearlman found significant stability of 
treatment preferences over a month-long period among a sample of 
thirty patients in a Seattle VA ICU.M5 In a study conducted by the 
same research group over a longer time frame, however, Patrick et 
al. found considerable changes in preferences for life-sustaining 
treatment.146 Patients were interviewed at baseline, 6,18, and 30 
months. Changes in preferences for life-sustaining treatment varied 
with patients’ assessments of their health status. These changes 
may reflect an increased willingness to tolerate conditions when 
their effects have been experienced and have become familiar to the 
patient.
When patients have decisionmaking capacity, such changes in 
preferences do not undermine respect for autonomy. Genuine 
changes of mind about health-care decisions should be respected, 
just as are changes of mind about other important life choices.
,<s Maria A. Everhart & Robert A- Pearlman, Stability of Patient Preferences Regarding 
Life-Sustaining Treatments, 97 CHEST 159 (1990).
1<s Donald L. Patrick e t aL, Validation of Preferences for Life-Sustaining Treatment: 
Implications for Advance Care Planning, 127 ANNALS INTERNAL Med. 009 (1997).
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When they rest in more complete knowledge, moreover, they are all 
the more to be respected. Suppose, however, that the apparent 
change of mind occurs on the part of a patient whose 
decisionmaking capacities are diminished, or who lacks capacities 
altogether. How should precedent directions be weighed against 
later apparent expressions of wishes by such patients?
One solution is to encourage patients to answer this question for 
themselves. One study reports that a considerable percentage of 
patients would prefer to give their health-care providers “leeway” 
in deciding whether to follow their advance directives for 
care—Sehgal et al. asked dialysis patients whether they would want 
dialysis continued if  they developed advanced Alzheimer’s disease 
(52% overall yes; 67% African-Americans yes), and whether they 
would want health-care providers to follow their advance directives 
about dialysis under the same circumstances.147 Only 39% of 
patients wanted their advance directives followed strictly; 19% 
wanted physicians to take “a little leeway,” 11% wanted “a lot of 
leeway,” and 31% wanted “complete leeway.”148 Patients with 
written advance directives (60%), younger patients (44%), and 
patients without a history of cancer (41%) were more likely to want 
directives to be followed strictly.149 Factors involved in the desire for 
leeway included pain or suffering, quality of life, possibility of a new 
treatment, indignity, financial impact, and religious beliefs. The 
authors of this study conclude that the SPA may more accurately 
reflect many patients’ choices than specific living wills, because the 
SPA can respond to changed circumstances, and further recommend 
that patients be asked to describe for their surrogates the extent to 
which they would want advance directives followed strictly.160
Nonetheless, even if patients instruct their surrogates in advance 
about the extent to which they want prior directives to be followed, 
conflicts may still arise between these instructions and the apparent 
expressed wishes or best interests of an incapacitated person. Such 
conflicts pit precedent autonomy against concerns that might be
147 Ashwini Sehgal e t aL, How Strictly Do Dialysis Patients Want Their Advance Directives 
Followed?, 267 J . AM. MED. 59,61 (1992).
Id.
149 Id.
150 Id. a t 62-63.
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voiced on behalf of the now-incapacitated Ronald Dworkin takes a 
hard line in favor of precedent autonomy: that unless the later 
expressions reflect reasoned decisions, respect for autonomy 
requires following the advance directive.151 Rebecca Dresser, on the 
other hand, defends protecting the interests of the now-incapaci­
tated person for the most part over the earlier choices.162
Dworkin’s picture is that if a now-incapacitated person cannot 
reason according to a plan, the precedent directives reflect auton­
omy but the later expressed wishes do not. The later wishes do not 
reflect a deeper sense of self, of character, or of values. On 
Dworkin’s view, therefore, autonomy supports honoring the earlier 
directives; but there is no case from autonomy for protecting the 
later wishes. The conflict lies instead between precedent autonomy 
and the interests of the now-incapacitated person, with expressions 
of present wishes—to the extent that the person remains able to 
express any wishes at all—considered in understanding the 
experiential interests of the incapacitated person.
At least one recent commentator, Agnieszka Jaworska, questions 
this picture. Jaworska argues that Dworkin discounts the extent to 
which patients with dementia are capable of autonomy because he 
relies on a misguided view of autonomy.153 In Jaworska’s view, the 
capacity to value is what is critical to autonomy. Patients with 
dementia may maintain the capacity to value even when they have 
lost short term memory or the ability to engage in means-end 
reasoning. Ifthey maintain consistency ofends, Jaworska contends, 
they can be assisted in the exercise of autonomy by others working 
with them and supporting them in the realization of their ends.154 
Moreover, she asserts, Dworkin is just wrong in asserting that the 
expressions of wishes by persons with dementia are characteristi­
cally fleeting, conflicting, or absent a link to identity. Jaworska 
reports stories of patients with moderate to severe dementia who 
nonetheless evidence values through their behavior, such as the 
desire to help others, the desire to remain independent, the desire
151 R onald Dworkin, L ife’s  Dominion: An Argum ent About A bortion, Euthanasia, 
AND INDIVIDUAL FREEDOM (1993); Dworkin, supra note 47, a t 14.
152 See infra note 158 for a  list of Dresser's works,
x 163 Jaworska, supra note 13, a t 125-29.
1M Id.
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not to go to day care, or the desire not to die.165 She concedes that 
patients with advanced dementia are not capable of deliberating 
about the adoption of new values or the resolution of conflicts among 
ends. With loss of the ability to form new memories, they become 
unable to form new values. Nor are they capable of critical reason­
ing about means. What they may maintain is a sense of what is of 
value to them, however faint and flickering. Jaworska also 
recognizes that the values maintained may be altered or diminished 
and that with the loss of capacity to reason will come a loss of 
abstract values, such as religious identity.168
Jaworska seems clearly right that a sense of what is valuable 
may remain even when the capacity for choice has been lost. 
Whether respect for these valuations is properly viewed as respect 
for autonomy is another matter, however. If autonomy means 
deliberating about one’s course in life and choosing for oneself, it 
should not be. Although patients with advancing dementia remain 
capable of having ends, they need assistance with the processes of 
choice that are crucial to autonomy. Jaworska does importantly 
remind us that the cognitive life of many persons with even severe 
dementia is far richer than Dworkin supposes. Precedent autonomy 
thus may conflict with a complex set of concerns and interests of the 
person with dementia, although it does not conflict with their 
autonomy. Along these same lines, Fellows suggests that we should 
try to understand the experiences of patients with dementia, of what 
their lives are like for them from the inside.157 If we do so, we will 
see that the significant moral conflict lies between precedent 
autonomy and the experiential interests of the now-incapacitated 
person.
For a  number of such reports, see JOHN BAYLEY, EliEGY FOB IRIS (1999); ANN 
Davidson, Alzheimer's , aloveStory: One Year inMy Husband’s J ourney (1997); Steven
B. Sabat, Voice of Alzheimer’s Disease Sufferers: A Call for Treatment Based on Personhood, 
9 J. C lin ica l E th ics  35 (1998).
166 Jaworska, supra note 13.
187 Fellows, supra note 27, a t 925.
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C. TRANSFORMATION OF THE SELF
At this point, critics of precedent autonomy may reach to a deeper 
metaphysical level. In addition to the concerns about precedent 
autonomy already discussed, Rebecca Dresser questions whether the 
precedent self has any authority over the now-incapacitated 
person.158 Her contention is that if the psychological connections 
between the now-incapacitated person and the person he used to be 
have become sufficiently attenuated, we should reconsider whether 
they are even the same person. If the patient with Alzheimer’s is 
genuinely “no longer himself,” the directives of precedent autonomy 
are as irrelevant to him as are the choices of an entirely different 
human being.
This “different person” argument draws on a view of personal 
identity developed by Derek Parfit, that identity consists in 
psychological connectedness.169 As the memories and other cognitive 
capacities of Alzheimer’s patients diminish, so do their psychological 
connectedness become increasingly attenuated. As psychological 
links fade, the former self disappears, to be replaced by a different 
self with a different mental life. Parfif s view of personal identity is 
intriguing and deeply controversial, but there are several reasons 
for rejecting it as a definitive argument against the authority of 
precedent autonomy for patients with dementia. First, it is a view 
about personal identity that is controversial for reasons far beyond 
the scope of this article. Second, patients with dementia may not 
experience dislocations sufficiently complete to be regarded as the 
emergence of a new self.160 If the descriptions of observers such as 
Sabat are correct, these patients first experience the
158 Rebecca S. Dresser, Autonomy Revisited: The Limits of Anticipatory Choices, in 
Dementia and Aging: Ethics, Values, and Policy Choices 71 (Robert H. Binstock et aL 
eds.f 1992); Rebecca Dresser, Life, Death, and Incompetent Patients: Conceptual Infirmities 
and Hidden Values in the Law, 28 ARIZ. L. Rev. 373, 376, 379 (1986); Rebecca Dresser, 
Missing Persons: Legal Perceptions of Incompetent Patients, 46 RUTGERS L. REV. 609,612 
(1994) [hereinafter Dresser, Missing Persons]; Rebecca Dresser & Peter J . Whitehouse, The 
Incompetent Patient on the Slippery Slope, 24 HASTINGS CENTER REP., July-Aug. 1994, at 6.
159 See generally DEREK PARFTT, REASONS AND PERSONS (Clarendon Press 1984).
160 Norman L. Cantor, Prospective Autonomy: On the Limits of Shaping One’s 
Postcompetence Medical Fate, 8 J. CONTEMP. HEALTH L. & POL*Y 13,31-33 (1992).
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disconnectedness associated with a loss of short-term memory.161 
Psychological connectedness to the memories of youth may be 
especially strong.162 As dementia progresses, they may lose sight of 
ends that require complex cognitive skills: the ability to do science, 
or religious faith. But even in these respects they may not be 
entirely disconnected from their earlier psychological histories. 
Sabat, for example, describes a man with moderate to severe 
dementia who had lost the ability to do science but who retained the 
sense of accomplishment associated with helping Sabat’s own study 
of Alzheimer’s disease.163 Jaworska’s account of the capacity of 
Alzheimer’s patients to value relies on just this connectedness with 
former aims.
A third reason to reject the “different person” argument is that 
it does not answer the full moral force of the argument for precedent 
autonomy. The argument for precedent autonomy is not only that 
persons have a right to have their choices respected across time. It 
is also that they have interests in the overall shape of their lives, 
including the form that will be taken at the end.164 They have 
interests in how they will be remembered by others, memories that 
will surely be affected by the character of their dying process. These 
interests are not expunged by the interests of the now-incapacitated, 
whether regarded as the same or a different person.
Fourth, the “different person” argument may prove too much. If 
the “different person” argument undermines the authority of 
precedent autonomy for health care, it may also undermine the 
authority of precedent autonomy more generally. Drickamer & 
Lachs point out that if precedent autonomy is undermined for the 
patient with dementia, it is also undermined for the patient with a
161 Sabat, supra note 155, a t 38.
m Stephen G. Post, TheM oral Challenge ofAlzheimerDisease (1995). Post relates 
this as a  story about the importance of honoring the patient’s former relationship* But thero 
is another way to tell th is story. Suppose that the patients attraction to the resident is based 
on liking in him, albeit in an inchoate way, the characteristics she had loved in her husband. 
Then there might be a sense in which the new relationship honors the old, even if it involves 
a confusion of identity as well. See also Stephen G. Post, Alzheimer Disease and the Then* 
Self; 5 Kennedy In st. E th ic s  J . 307,307-08 (1995).
163 Sabat, supra note 155, at 41-43.
m DWORKIN, supra note 151, at 227. For good examples of the shape of a life, see ROBERT
C.S. Downs, The F if th  Season (2000), Bayley, supra note 155, G. R o b ert A rtley , Ginny: 
A Love Remembered (1993).
H e i n O n l i n e  - -  35 Ga . L. R e v . 5 76  2 0 0 0 - 2 0 0 1
2001] DECISIONMAKING AT THE END OF LIFE 577
swifter cognitive decline, such as a patient who has become 
incapacitated from metastatic brain cancer.166 Post relates the tale 
of a nursing home resident who mistakes another resident for her 
deceased spouse and wants to cohabit with him; her daughter 
refused consent because it would make a “mockery” of her parents' 
loving relationship, now past.166 Cantor observes that it is difficult 
to distinguish rejecting precedent autonomy for health-care 
decisions but not for other decisions, such as property arrangements 
or wills.167 Many social mechanisms have been developed specifi­
cally to allow people to be confident that their present desires to 
provide for the future will be respected over time. A response to this 
argument is that health-care decisions are special; they may mean 
life and death itself. But even property arrangements may be 
similarly critical, if  resources otherwise assigned are required for 
life-saving care.
Moreover, the “different person" argument may have particularly 
troublesome implications for the SPA for health care. Even if  the 
argument is limited to health-care decisions, it applies with equal 
force to living wills and to SPAs. It then suggests that if the now- 
incapacitated person has formed different attachments, new 
surrogate decisionmakers would be appropriate even when an SPA 
was appointed through the exercise of precedent autonomy. The 
particularly counter-intuitive result is that the authority of the 
patient’s chosen surrogate to make health-care decisions would be 
undermined, but the surrogate would retain authority to make all 
other decisions. This distinction seems odd at best; the chosen SPA 
should have the authority to make health-care decisions as well as 
other decisions, unless there is some reason for doubting his good 
faith. There are reasons for doubting the authority of the SPA, but 
they arise when the SPA fails to act in good faith to protect the 
patient, not because the patient has become an ostensibly different 
person.
165 Margaret A. Drickamer & Mark S. Lachs, Should Patients with Alzheimer’s Disease 
be Told Their Diagnosis?, 326 NEW ENG. J . MED. 947 (1992).
166 Post, supra note 162, a t 309.
167 Cantor, supra note 160, a t 28.
H e i n O n l i n e  - -  35 Ga . L. R e v . 5 77  2 0 0 0 - 2 0 0 1
578 GEORGIA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 35:539
Finally, the “different person” argument is not necessary to the 
central moral point of those who challenge precedent autonomy. 
Jaworska observes that conflicts between precedent autonomy and 
the interests of incapacitated persons are apparent without resort 
to metaphysics:
the moral pull of Dresser’s position is undeniable: the 
caregiver. . .  is faced with a person—or if not a fully 
constituted person, at least a conscious being capable 
of pleasure and pain—who, here and now, makes a 
claim on the caregiver to fulfill her needs and desires; 
why ignore these needs and desires in the name of 
values that are now extinct?168
Dresser contends that autonomy is not the sole value involved in 
decisions; it may be overridden by the present benefits and burdens 
of a treatment decision. Even Ronald Dworkin puts the dilemma 
starkly: “Does a competent person’s right to autonomy include, for 
example, the power to dictate that life-prolonging treatment be 
denied him later, or that funds not be spent on maintaining him in 
great comfort, even if he, when demented, pleads for it?”169 The real 
conflicts here lie between prior choice and present interests; 
resolving them requires analyzing the interests of persons with 
dementia and understanding their potential moral force. Dresser 
powerfully points out the deception frequently involved in wanting 
to believe in the accuracy of a reconstruction of what the patient 
“would have wanted”; she may also be right in speculating that this 
deception should be attributed to the fact that it is people with 
competence who have developed decisionmaking models for people 
who lack competence.170
Thus arguments against precedent autonomy are either incom­
plete or flawed. Nonetheless, they rest on an important underlying 
moral concern: that respect for precedent autonomy may conflict
169 Jaworska, supra note 13, a t 108.
163 Dworkin, supra note 151, a t 211.
170 Dresser & Whitehouse, supra note 158, at 7.
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with the current interests of a demented patient, and it requires 
argument to determine which should prevail.
IV . Decisio nm aking  Abo u t  Care: 
t h e  Patient’s  Be st  In terests
Critics of precedent autonomy contend that the interests of 
incapacitated persons should take priority over values that are no 
longer experienced by patients with dementia. The need to protect 
the interests of an existing, incompetent being is a powerful moral 
concern. The “best interests” standardis generally recommended as 
the means to that protection. The “best interest” standard is also 
recommended for decisionmakingwhenpatients* advance wishes are 
not fully known. Evaluating these arguments requires a clear 
understanding of what is meant by “interests.” But there are 
several different accounts in the literature of what is meant by 
“interests” for purposes of the “best interests” standard. This 
section begins by explaining several different concepts of “inter­
ests,” arguing that interests should be understood in the “experien­
tial” sense when care decisions must be made for patients with 
dementia.
A. BEST INTERESTS: UNDERSTANDING THE CONCEPT OF “INTEREST”
The concept of “interests” is understood in significantly different 
ways in the law, in commentary about it, and in the bioethics 
literature. To take one legal example, the Uniform Health-Care 
Decisions Act Section 2(e) provides that health-care agents should 
make decisions based on the patient’s best interests, if there are no 
individual instructions for care by the patient himself.171 The Act 
further provides that “In d e t e r m i n i n g  the principal’s best interest, 
the agent shall consider the principal’s personal values to the extent 
known to the agent.”172 This recommendation links values formerly 
held by a person to a determination of present interests. To take a 
second example, the Maryland statute governing end of life
171 9, Part IB, U.LJL 152 (2000). 
,M Id.
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decisionmaking specifies a remarkably expansive definition of “best 
interest”:
‘Best interest’ means that the benefits to the individ­
ual resulting from a treatment outweigh the burdens 
to the individual resulting from that treatment, 
taking into account: (1) The effect of the treatment 
on the physical, emotional, and cognitive functions of 
the individual; (2) The degree of physical pain or 
discomfort caused to the individual by the treatment, 
or the withholding or withdrawal of the treatment; (3)
The degree to which the individual’s medical condi­
tion, the treatment, or the withholding or withdrawal 
of treatment result in a severe and continuing impair­
ment of the dignity of the individual by subjecting the 
individual to a condition of extreme humiliation and 
dependency; (4) The effect of the treatment on the life 
expectancy of the individual; (5) The prognosis of the 
individual for recovery, with and without the treat­
ment; (6) The risks, side effects, and benefits of the 
treatment or the withholding or withdrawal of the 
treatment; and (7) The religious beliefs and basic 
values of the individual receiving treatment, to the 
extent these may assist the decisionmaker in deter­
mining best interest.173
This provision incorporates the patient’s experiences, dignity, and 
values, among other factors, into the determination of interests.
Commentators employ at least four different ways “interests” 
may be understood in statutes like these and in the legal cases 
applying the best interests standard: experiential interests, patient 
preferences, patient values, and “objective” or “critical” interests. 
This section distinguishes the four, and argues that the idea of 
“experiential interests” best captures the moral concerns raised by 
critics of precedent autonomy.
173 MD. CODE ANN., HEALTH-GEN. I § 5-601(e) (2000).
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“Experiential interests” rest on the patients own experiences. 
They include perceptions of pleasure and pain, comfort and 
discomfort, along with other sensations felt by the patient. Because 
pleasure and pain figure importantly in the experiences of patients, 
these may be called “hedonic” theories, but it is important to 
remember that patients’ exp eriences include far more than pleasure 
and pain.174 In arguing that the interests of an incapacitated person 
should be favored over precedent autonomy, Dresser employs this 
concept of experiential interests: “Whether there is pain, distress, 
pleasure, physical movement, or interaction with people andobjects 
in the surrounding world.”176 It is in the experiential sense that 
patients in a persistent coma are said to have no interests because 
they have no cognitive experiences. To be sure, there may be 
difficulties in ascertaining the experiential interests of patients who 
cannot communicate. Dresser, however, provides a helpful account 
of why we should not assume that there are theoretical barriers to 
understanding the experiences of people with dementia as well as 
an account of how these experiences can be accessed176
A second understanding of interests identifies them with 
expressed preferences. On this view, patients have interests in 
what they say they want. When patients cannot communicate 
preferences directly, however, this understanding of interests may 
be difficult to employ. One strategy is to extrapolate preferences 
from behavior. Patients who attempt to remove feeding tubes, for 
example, may be understood as wanting the tube removed, and thus 
as having interests in its removal. Dresser criticizes this account as 
insufficiently attentive to the meaning of patients’ behavior.177 She 
contends that we are too likely to read our own understandings into 
such behaviors and to see them as meaningful expressions of 
preference when they are not. To the extent that they are meaning­
ful, she contends, these behaviors should be taken as indicative of
174 Bruce Jennings, A Life Greater Than the Sum of Its Sensations: Ethics, Dementia, and 
the Quality of Life, 5 J . MENTAL HEALTH & AGING 95,100 (1999).
175 Dresser, Missing Persons, supra note 158, at 638.
1,8 See generally id. (arguing courts should focus on patient's actual experiences rather 
than patient’s hypothetical, rational choice).
177 Id.
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the nature of the patient’s experiences.178 Thus the patient’s pulling 
at a feeding tube might reflect experienced discomfort, rather than 
the desire that the tube be removed. For patients who cannot 
express preferences, therefore, the expressed preference account is 
arguably not independent of the experiential account.
A third understanding of interests rests on the patient’s values. 
Jennings calls this a “rational desire” theory; the idea is that 
patients may be thought to rationally desire (if not actually desire) 
what they value.179 The patient’s values are incorporated into the 
definition of interests in both the Uniform Act and the Maryland 
statute.180 The possibility that a patient with dementia might have 
interests in this sense is controversial, however. Dworkin rejects 
the possibility that patients with severe dementia can value; just as 
he rejects the possibility that a patient can exercise autonomy 
without having a sense of self, so he rejects the possibility that such 
apatientcanvalue.181 Jaworska, in contrast, describes how patients 
with dementia can still engage in valuing.182 She argues that such 
patients can have ends and can have beliefs about what is worth­
while, even when they have lost the thread of the narrative of their 
own lives.183 Jaworska distinguishes such valuings from “experien­
tial” interests because they may not be fully occurrent for the 
patient.184 Depending on the extent of the patient’s cognitive 
disorganization, valuings may not be reflected in the patient’s 
present experiences even though the patient continues to rely on 
them in an inchoate way. What becomes problematic, then, is why 
such valuings should matter in d e c i s i o n m a k i n g  for an incapacitated 
person. On the one hand, to the extent they are reflected in the 
patient’s experiences, valuings are captured by the experiential 
sense of interests. On the other hand, the case for including them 
would seem to be respect for the person as a holder of values. But 
why should such respect be grounded in what is admittedly a pale
178 Id.
,re Jennings, supra note 174.
180 See supra note 173 and accompanying text (discussing Uniform Act and Maryland 
Statutes).
181 Dworkin, supra note 151.
182 Jaworska, supra note 13, a t 109.
183 Id.
184 Id.
H e i n O n l i n e  - -  35 Ga . L. R e v . 5 82  2 0 0 0 - 2 0 0 1
2001] DECISIONMAKING AT THE END OF LIFE 583
reflection of the person’s prior values? The beat answer lies in terms 
of prior autonomy: that to the extent that they remain values at all, 
they are continuations of the person’s prior goals. Viewed in this 
way, the understanding of interests as values dissolves either into 
concern for the nature of the patient’s present experiences or respect 
for precedent autonomy.
Finally, commentators identify the “critical” or “objective” 
interests of patients. These are interests all people have, such as 
the ability to interact with other human beings. This is called by 
Parfit and others the “objective” interest standard;185 Jennings 
refers to it as a theory of human flourishing.186 As a standard that 
refers to what is valuable for all, “criticalinterests” are independent 
of the patient’s own values or experiences. Thus “critical interests” 
should not be identified with the patients values. Indeed, a 
patient’s values such as identification with a religious tradition that 
rejects certain forms of health care might be inconsistent with the 
critical interest in being free of pain. The “critical interests” 
standard is normative: it represents an account of what is good for 
the patient, rather than what the patients actually experiences or 
value themselves. Dworkin, for example, holds that experiential 
interests are interests in pleasant feelings such as being comforted 
and reassured, whereas “critical interests” involve what is needed 
to make one’s life better on the whole.187 In describing critical 
interests, Dresser includes: “The usual candidates for interests 
include biological life, sensations, emotions and other conscious 
experiences, physical functioning, individual preferences and 
desires, and such higher-level matters as concern for others and the 
pursuit of complex goals and long-term projects.”188 She rejects 
reliance on critical interests in decisionmaking for patients with 
dementia, arguing that many such patients will lack critical 
interests in Dworkin’s sense and that it is the quality of their 
experiences which matter the most to them.189 It is not clear, 
however, that Dresser and Dworkin are right to conclude that
165 Parfit, supra note 159.
m  Jennings, supra note 174, at 10L
187 DWORKIN, supra note 151, a t 229-30.
m  Dresser, Missing Persons, supra note 168, a t 658.
189 I d  a t 639.
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incapacitated persons lack critical interests. Such interests could 
be defended on the basis of a general theory about what is good for 
persons, even when incapacitated. What they are right about is that 
the case for critical interests must be a normative one, separated 
from both precedent autonomy and the patient’s current experi­
ences. To the extent that decisionmaking for incapacitated persons 
should be limited to their own values and experiences, reliance on 
"critical interests” represents making value judgments for them 
rather than on their behalf.
There are thus four separable concepts of interest that figure into 
the discussions of decisionmaking for patients with dementia. 
“Experiential” interests refer to the nature of the patient’s actual 
experiences. Apparent preferences, to the extent they can be 
ascertained, are evidence of experiences. What might be called 
“valuings” refer to the patient’s presently existing values to the 
extent that the patient is capable of valuing, and arguably are but 
a pallid reflection of precedent autonomy. Finally, “critical” 
interests refer to normative judgments of what would be good for the 
patient. The moral concern of the critics of precedent autonomy is 
that it ignores the felt experiences of the now-incapacitated person. 
On the basis of that moral concern, the interests of patients with 
dementia should be viewed as experiential interests.130
B. CARE DECISIONS AND THE EXPERIENTIAL INTERESTS OF PATIENTS 
WITH DEMENTIA
An assessment of the experiential interests of patients with 
dementia must face the initial problem that knowledge about such 
patients is sketchy and quite possibly biased. Knowledge is lacking 
both about what might be medically beneficial for such patients in 
terms of extending life or reducing morbidity, about what their 
experiences are like, and about what various therapies might feel 
like for them.
Until quite recently, there has been little systematic study of the 
benefits of different care modalities for patients with dementia.
190 See id.; Sanford H. Kadish, Letting Patients Die: Legal and Moral Reflections, 80 CAL. 
L. Rev. 857,871-78 (1992); Lynn et al., supra note 130, a t 274.
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This lacuna has begun to be addressed by several quite recent 
studies in the medical literature. Morrison and Siu identify quite 
high six-month mortality rates for patients with dementia and hip 
fractures (55%) or pneumonia (53%) compared to cognitively intact 
patients with the same conditions.191 They also find no difference in 
the rate of care interventions between the two groups.192 An ongoing 
problem, however, is assessing whether the level of intervention 
affects both survival and quality of life. Morrison and Siu also find 
that patients with dementia are less likely to receive pain medica­
tion than cognitively intact patients;193 moreover, only 24% of 
patients with dementia and hip fracture received standing orders for 
analgesics, despite the likelihood that they would have difficulty in 
communicating about pain.194 Finucane, Christmas & Travis 
question whether tube feeding is beneficial either in extending life 
or in preventing aspiration pneumonia.195 Brauner, Muir & Sachs 
consider how dementia affects the risk/benefit ratio of medications 
for patients with dementia, observing that common medications may 
be less safe in a patient population who may have difficulty taking 
medications as directed and who are unable to report side effects.198 
Their examples are warfarin for atrial fibrillation (with the 
complication of bleeding from bruising suffered in falls, more likely 
in dementia patients) and alendronate for osteoporosis (erosive 
esophagitis, more likely to pass unreportedin dementia patients).197 
They also question the advisability of dietary restrictions to lower 
cholesterol in a population with problematic nutritional status and 
the possible disturbing nature of routine screening for colorectal 
cancer by colonoscopy in a population that cannot understand the 
procedure.198




195 Thomas E. Finucane et aL, Tube Feeding in Patients with Advanced Dementia: A 
Review of the Evidence, 282 JAMA 1365,1369 (1999).
158 Daniel J. Brauner et aL, Treating Nondementia Illnesses in Patients with Dementia, 
283 JAMA 3230,3230-35 (2000).
197 Id. a t  3231-33.
193 Id  a t  3233.
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Several other studies address the problem of bias in assessing the 
experiences of patients with dementia. MacKenzie, Robiner & 
Knopman report a nearly four-fold increase in diagnoses of depres­
sion for patients with Alzheimer’s disease when diagnoses included 
information from family members rather than just interviews with 
the patient.199 Another problem is how much the quality of patients’ 
experiences is affected by how these patients are treated. Kutner et 
al. studied family members’ perceptions of improvement for patients 
with dementia admitted to care facilities.200 Family members did 
not perceive improvement in physical or cognitive status.201 
However, the study reports that family members did perceive 
significantly increased quality of life for patients admitted to a 
special care unit for patients with dementia (55% improved 
emotional functioning and 46% improved social functioning on a 
special care unit in comparison to 27% improved emotional function 
and 7% improved social functioning on a non-special-care floor).202 
This study also reports increased improvement in special care units 
that are more highly staffed.203
Several recent studies have addressed the issue of assessing 
quality of life for patients with dementia. These studies suggest the 
need to broaden accounts of the experiential interests of patients 
with dementia from a narrow focus on pleasure and pain. Brod et 
al. report success in using an instrument for measuring quality of 
life in patients with mild to moderate dementia.204 They note that 
domains such as aesthetic experience and the capacity to interact 
with the environment may be especially important to assessing 
quality of life for patients with dementia. Teri and Logsdon describe 
the involvement of patients with dementia in evaluating their
199 Thomas B. Mackenzie e t aL, Differences Between Patient and Family Assessments of 
Depression in Alzheimer's Disease, 146 AM. J. OF PSYCHIATRY 1174,1178 (1989). Tho study 
revealed a 13.9% rate of depression based on interviews with the patients, but a 50% rato 
when the patient interviewed was supplemented by information from the family. Id.
200 Nancy G. Kutner et al., Family Members* Perceptions of Quality of Life Change in 
Dementia SCU Residents, 18 J. APPLIED GERONTOLOGY 423 (1999).
201 Id. a t 432.
202 Id. a t  432-33.
203 Id. a t 434-35.
204 Meryl Brod e t al., Conceptualization and Measurement of Quality of Life in Dementia: 
The Dementia Quality of Life Instrument (DQoL), 39 GERONTOLOGIST 25 (1999).
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enjoyment of activities.205 But Fellows cautions against reading 
physicians’ values into the assessments.208 Jennings also points out 
how assessments may be biased.207 A recent British study indicates 
that cognitively impaired elders can give m e a n i n g f u l  answers to 
quality of life questions, even if they appear to be significantly 
impaired on the MMSE (scores of 10-17).208 Gonzalez-SalvadoretaL 
measured quality of life among dementia patients in a Maryland 
long-term care facility.209 They concluded that higher quality of life 
scores were associated with residency in assisted living rather than 
in skilled nursing facilities, andlower scores with increased physical 
dependency, depression, and treatment with anxiolytic agents.
The lack of information about treatment effects and patient 
experiences may be reflected in decisionmaking about patients with 
dementia. A recent study by Mitchell et aL found that a sample of 
patients in American facilities who were receivingtube feeding were 
far more likely to have a diagnosis of dementia than a sample of 
patients in a Canadian facility.210 The study was designed to find 
out how tube feeding decisions are made, given the questionable 
benefit of the intervention in patients with dementia. Surrogates 
felt that they understood benefits (83%) but not the risks (45.6%) of 
tube feeding. Tube feeding was instituted to prolong life (84%) and 
to prevent aspiration (67%). Fewer than 20% of the patients had a 
living will, and fewer than half of the surrogates were confident that 
tube feeding was what the patient would have wanted. In a bow 
towards prior autonomy, the authors suggest surrogates need better 
medical information and better information about patients’ wishes 
in making decisions about tube feeding.211
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205 Linda Teri & Rebecca G. Lognson, Identifying Pleasant Activities for Alzheimer’s 
Disease Patients: The Pleasant Events Schedule-AD, 31 GERONTOLOGIST 124 (1991).
208 Fellows, supra note 27.
207 Jennings, supra note 174.
203 Caroline Godlove Mozley et aL, Wot Knowing Where I  am Doesn't Mean I  Don't Know 
WhatlLike’: Cognitive Impairment and Quality of Life Responses in Elderly People, MlNI'L 
J. Geriatric Psychiatry 776 (1999).
209 Teresa Gonzalez-Salvador e t aL, Quality of Life in Dementia Patients in Long-Term 
Care, 15 INT’L J. GERIATRIC PSYCHIATRY 181 (2000).
210 Susan L. Mitchell et aL, A Cross-National Survey of Tube-Feeding Decisions in 
Cognitively Impaired Older Persons, 48 J. AM. GERIATRICS SOC’Y 391 (2000).
211 Jd. a t 396-97.
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Decisions about end of life care for patients with dementia may 
involve management of conditions that are directly linked to the 
dementia, such as nutritional compromise and the possibility of 
medical intervention by means of a feeding tube. They may involve 
treatment for conditions that are unrelated to the dementia, such as 
cancer or diabetes. Finally, they may involve management of 
distress and pain that accompany whatever care modalities are—or 
are not—employed. On an experiential account of interests, 
decisions of each of these kinds should center on the character of the 
patient’s experiences. Dresser summarizes this as a revised best 
interests standard: "give priority to protection of incompetent 
patients’ experiential interests, yet also acknowledge that signifi­
cant cognitive impairment can minimize the value of prolonged life 
for some patients.”212 If life-extending medical care will prolong, to 
a significant extent, a life of relatively pleasurable experiences, it 
should be chosen for the patient. On the other hand, as Dresser 
argues, on the experiential standard life-extending care may be 
foregone when the patient has very limited capacities for experi­
ences; extending life itself is not in the patient’s experiential 
interests in such cases.213
Consider first the application of such principles based on 
experiential interests to conditions related to the dementia itself. 
Care that would not be effective should not be provided; further 
research is clearly required on the effectiveness of care modalities 
frequently employed in end stage dementia, such as antibiotics for 
aspiration pneumonia or tube feeding. Care may also be foregone 
when it would prolong life in a patient of limited capacity for 
experiences at all, such as Edna F.214 It would also be appropriate 
to withhold care that is burdensome in comparison to the extent to 
which it would extend the patient’s likely capacity for pleasurable 
experiences; ventilator support for a pneumonia from which the 
patient might recover is a possible example. On the other hand, 
care should be provided when it would help the patient to retain the 
capacity for ongoing satisfying experiences.
212 Dresser, Missing Persons, supra note 168, a t 692.
213 Id. a t 694-709.
211 In re Guardianship of Edna M.F., 563 N.W.2d 485 (Wis. 1997).
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Now consider care for conditions that are independent of the 
dementia. Care decisions generally should be evaluated in light of 
their safety and efficacy in patients with dementia, rather than in 
light of the experience of the general patient population. Recom­
mendations for otherwise ordinary diagnostic care might be altered 
in light of the extent to which they are intrusive and disturbing, in 
comparison to the likelihood that the results would influence 
management decisions that would prolong satisfying life. Care may 
also be foregone if  the treatment needed has serious, persisting 
adverse experiential consequences such as the need for ongoing 
restraint to administer it. Dresser and Whitehouse suggest that 
patients with multi-infarct dementia who are bedridden may 
experience even hygienic care as “torture”; treatment of associated 
illnesses might be forgone in these patients.215 Another group in 
which care might be foregone is dementia patients who are severely 
agitated or paranoid, who experience terror at care modalities 
including restraints.
Finally, palliative care is central to the experiences of many 
patients, but may be forgotten in the situation of patients with 
dementia. The limitation of the hospice benefit to patients with life 
expectancies of six months or less may contribute to this absence, 
since patients with dementia may not be identified as “terminally 
ill” during the downhill course of disease.216 Pain from conditions 
such as arthritis may be under-treated in patients with dementia 
because of their inability to communicate distress. Other forms of 
comfort care, such as the warmth of a personal touch or the 
individual interaction in an effort to provide nutrition orally may be 
very difficult in an under-staffed long-term care facility. Focus on 
experiential interests warrants a particularly strong endorsement 
of the importance of comfort care and symptom management in 
patients with dementia.
As the review above indicates, too little is known about the 
medical potential of treatment in patients with dementia or about 
the experiences of patients. Several cautions are especially 
important, in light of these difficulties. It is important not to
215 Dresser & Whitehouse, supra note 158.
!le See Recommendations of the Joint Conference, 35 Ga. L. REV. 423,435-37 (2001).
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assume in the absence of data that care will be beneficial—or that 
it will not be. It is important not to confuse a judgment that care is 
futile in the medical sense with the judgment that it is not worth­
while on some other standard: the quality of the patient’s experi­
ences, the judgments of others about such experiences, or the costs 
of the care. And it is important not to confuse the experiences of the 
patient with the judgments of others about whether care violates 
“dignity” or is something they would value.
C. CARE PARADIGMS AND THE INTERESTS OF OTHERS
Commentators with leanings towards communitarian or feminist 
moral theories point out that patients’ interests are not alone in 
decisionmaking about care. Dresser217 and Lynn et al.218 suggest 
that the family should play a role in shaping the understanding of 
the interests of an incapacitated person, just as parents may play 
legitimate roles in shaping the interests of their children. And the 
family has interests, too. Statutes identifying surrogates, as well as 
support for SPAs sometimes reflect these interests. High defends 
the role of families in making care decisions on the basis that they 
have important interests, too.219 These observations take the focus 
of decisionmaking away from the patient viewed as an individual, 
or away from the patient altogether. Although this article’s primary 
focus has been the patient as an individual, two brief observations 
are perhaps in order. First, on the experiential account of interests 
the role of others is secondary; they matter only insofar as their 
actions and interactions with the patient affect the patient’s 
experiences. Second, to base decisionmaking on the concerns of 
families shifts the moral focus away from the patient, a shift that 
may be justified but that raises issues far beyond the treatment of 
patients with dementia.
217 Dresser, Missing Persons, supra note 158.
218 Lynn e t aL, supra note 130.
219 Dallas M. High, Families' Roles in Advance Directivest 24 HASTINGS CENTER REP., 
Nov.-Dee. 1994, at S16.
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V . Reso lv in g  Conflicts B etw een  P recedent  
Auto no m y  an d  Experiential  Interests
The central conflict in decisionmaking for p atients with dementia 
thus lies between precedent autonomy—following what is known 
about the patient’s prior choices—and the patient’s current experi­
ences. Patients may have left directives that, if followed, will limit 
their ability to continue with ongoing, pleasant experiences. Or, 
they may have left directives for continuing care that will now cause 
them pain that they do not understand. Precedent autonomy may 
be exercised directly through prescribed decisions or through the 
appointment of a surrogate, or indirectly through extrapolation from 
what is known about expressed wishes. Defenders of precedent 
autonomy would resolve conflicts in its favor, observing that many 
choices against interests are honored for competent patients.220 
Dresser and other critics are correct in observing, however, that 
even the most explicit prior pronouncements by a patient may not 
be an accurate measure of what the patient really meant to choose 
for current circumstances. The further the departure from explicit 
guidelines, moreover, the less reliable the guidance. Dresser would, 
therefore, resolve the conflicts in favor of protecting the interests of 
the now-incapacitated person.
At the same time, the case for reliance on experiential interests 
may also be overstated. Continuing treatment that will cause pain, 
failing to provide appropriate palliative care, and providing or 
withholding care in a manner that is disturbing to the patient is 
clearly injurious to the now-incapacitated person. Following an 
advance directive against providing life-extending therapy when a 
patient still has some pleasurable experiences is not injurious in the 
same sense. It may not prolong the pleasurable experiences, but it 
does not cause pain, either. This observation suggests a different 
resolution of the conflict between precedent autonomy and experien­
tial interests.
To the extent that the directives of precedent autonomy are dear, 
they should control. They should not control, however, when the 
result would be to cause significant harm—pain, terror, or other
220 Cantor, supra note 160, at 39.
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immediately dysphoric experiences—to the patient with dementia. 
As the guidance in prior directives becomes less clear, it should be 
weighed against the experiential interests of incapacitated persons. 
Experiential interests in turn are less weighty to the extent that 
cognitive capacities fade. Thus a relatively clear advance directive 
would prevail over fading experiences of the incapacitated person; 
and relatively intense pleasant experiences of the incapacitated 
person would prevail over fragmentary guidance. These recommen­
dations are messy; their force may not be obvious in particular 
cases. But they seem to capture what is morally important about 
precedent autonomy—guidance for how one’s life winds down—as 
well as what is morally important about experiential interests: 
avoiding pain and continuing experiences of relative quality to the 
extent that clear prior autonomy is not compromised.
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